University of California • Berkeley

Regional Oral History Office The Bancroft Library

University of California Berkeley, California

Government History Documentation Project Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era

Jaquelin Hume

REPUBLICAN PHILOSOPHY AND PARTY ACTIVISM

Basic Economics and the Body Politic: Views of a Northern California Reagan Loyalist

Eleanor Ring Storrs Parties, Politics, and Principles: "It's at

the Local Level"

Jack Wrather Tirso del Junco

On Friendship, Politics, and Government

California Republican Party Leadership and Success, 1966-1982

Interviews Conducted by Gabrielle Morris and Sarah Sharp 1982-1983

Copyright

1984 by the Regents of the University of Calfiornia

This manuscript is made available for research purposes. No part of the manuscript may be quoted for publication without the written permission of the Director of The Bancroft Library of the University of California at Berkeley.

Requests for permission to quote for publication should be addressed to the Regional Oral History Office, 486 Library, and should include identification of the specific passages to be quoted, anticipated use of the passages, and identification of the user.

It is recommended that this oral history be cited as follows :

To cite the volume: Republican Philosophy and Party Activism, an oral history conducted 1982-1983, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1984.

To cite an individual interview: Jaquelin Hume, "Basic Economics and the Body Politic: Views of a Northern California Reagan Loyalist," an oral history conducted 1982 by Gabrielle Morris, in Republican Philosophy and Party Activism, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1984.

Copy No.

On behalf of future scholars, the Regional Oral History Office wishes to thank those who have responded to the Office's request for funds to continue documentation of Ronald Reagan's years as governor of California. Donors to the project as of May 1984 are listed below.

Anonymous

Margaret Brock

Monroe Browne

Edward W. Carter

Sherman Chickering

Aylett B. Cotton

Justin Dart

William C. Edwards

William Randolph Hearst

William Hewlett

Jaquelin Hume

Earle Jorgensen

L. W. Lane, Jr.

Gordon C. Luce

Norman B. Livermore, Jr.

Joseph A. and Gladys G. Moore

David Packard

Robert 0. Reynolds

Henry and Grace Salvatori

Porter Sesnon

Dean A. Watkins

PREFACE

California government and politics from 1966 through 1974 are the focus of the Reagan Gubernatorial Era Series of the state Government History Documenta tion Project, conducted by the Regional Oral History Office of The Bancroft Library with the participation of the oral history programs at the Davis and Los Angeles campuses of the University of California, Claremont Graduate School, and California State University at Fullerton. This series of interviews carries forward studies of significant issues and processes in public administration begun by the Regional Oral History Office in 1969. In previous series, inter views with over 220 legislators, elected and appointed officials, and others active in public life during the governorships of Earl Warren, Goodwin Knight, and Edmund Brown, Sr., were completed and are now available to scholars.

The first unit in the Government History Documentation Project, the Earl Warren Series, produced interviews with Warren himself and others centered on key developments in politics and government administration at the state and county level, innovations in criminal justice, public health, and social welfare from 1925-1953. Interviews in the Knight-Brown Era continued the earlier inquiries into the nature of the governor's office and its relations with executive departments and the legislature, and explored the rapid social and economic changes in the years 1953-1966, as well as preserving Brown's own account of his extensive political career. Among the issues documented were the rise and fall of the Democratic party; establishment of the California Water Plan; election law changes, reapportionment and new political techniques; education and various social programs.

During Ronald Reagan's years as governor, important changes became evident in California government and politics. His administration marked an end to the progressive period which had provided the determining outlines of government organization and political strategy since 1910 and the beginning of a period of limits in state policy and programs, the extent of which is not yet clear. Interviews in this series deal with the efforts of the administration to increase government efficiency and economy and with organizational innovations designed to expand the management capability of the governor's office, as well as critical aspects of state health, education, welfare, conservation, and criminal justice programs. Legislative and executive department narrators provide their perspec tives on these efforts and their impact on the continuing process of legislative and elective politics.

Work began on the Reagan Gubernatorial Era Series in 1979. Planning and research for this phase of the project were augmented by participation of other oral history programs with experience in public affairs. Additional advisors were selected to provide relevant background for identifying persons to be interviewed and understanding of issues to be documented. Project research files, developed by the Regional Oral History Office staff to provide a systematic background for questions, were updated to add personal, topical, and chronological data for the Reagan period to the existing base of information for 1925 through 1966, and to supplement research by participating programs as needed. Valuable, continuing assistance in preparing for interviews was provided by the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, which houses the Ronald Reagan Papers, and by the State Archives in Sacramento.

ii

An effort was made to select a range of interviewees that would reflect the increase in government responsibilities and that would represent diverse points of view. In general, participating programs were contracted to conduct interviews on topics with which they have particular expertise, with persons presently located nearby. Each interview is identified as to the originating institution. Most interviewees have been queried on a limited number of topics with which they were personally connected; a few narrators with unusual breadth of experience have been asked to discuss a multiplicity of subjects. When possible, the interviews have traced the course of specific issues leading up to and resulting from events during the Reagan administration in order to develop a sense of the continuity and interrelationships that are a significant aspect of the government process.

Throughout Reagan's years as governor, there was considerable interest and speculation concerning his potential for the presidency; by the time interview ing for this project began in late 1980, he was indeed president. Project interviewers have attempted, where appropriate, to retrieve recollections of that contemporary concern as it operated in the governor's office. The intent of the present interviews, however, is to document the course of California government from 1967 to 1974, and Reagan's impact on it. While many interview ees frame their narratives of the Sacramento years in relation to goals and performance of Reagan's national administration, their comments often clarify aspects of the gubernatorial period that were not clear at the time. Like other historical documentation, these oral histories do not in themselves provide the complete record of the past. It is hoped that they offer firsthand experience of passions and personalities that have influenced significant events past and present.

The Reagan Gubernatorial Era Series was begun with funding from the California legislature via the office of the Secretary of State and continued through the generosity of various individual donors. Several memoirs have been funded in part by the California Women in Politics Project under a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, including a matching grant from the Rockefeller Foundation; by the Sierra Club Project also under a NEH grant; and by the privately funded Bay Area State and Regional Planning Project. This joint funding has enabled staff working with narrators and topics related to several projects to expand the scope and thoroughness of each individial interview involved by careful coordination of their work.

The Regional Oral History Office was established to tape record autobio graphical interviews with persons significant in the history of California and the West. The Office is under the administrative direction of James D. Hart, Director of the Bancroft Library, and Willa Baum, head of the Office. Copies of all interviews in the series are available for research use in The Bancroft Library, UCLA Department of Special Collections, and the State Archives in Sacramento. Selected interviews are also available at other manuscript depositories.

July 1982 Gabrielle Morris

Regional Oral History Office Project Director

486 The Bancroft Library University of California at Berkeley

ill

REAGAN GUBERNATORIAL ERA PROJECT

Advisory Council

Eugene Bardach James W. Leiby

Charles Benson Edwin Meese III

Nicole Biggart Sheldon L. Messinger

John Burns James R. Mills

Lou Cannon William K. Muir

Bert Coffey Charles Palm

Edmund Constantini A. Alan Post

Lawrence deGraaf Albert S. Rodda

Enid Douglass Ed Salzman

Harold E. Geiogue Paul Seabury

James Gregory Alex Sherriffs

Ronald Grele Michael E. Smith

Gary Hamilton A. Ruric Todd

Mary Ellen Leary Molly Sturges Tuthill

Eugene C. Lee Raymond Wolfinger

Interviewers

Malca Chall A.I. Dickman* Enid Douglass Steve Edgington Harvey Grody Gabrielle Morris Sarah Sharp Julie Shearer Stephen Stern Mitch Tuchman

^Deceased during the term of the project

iv

GOVERNMENT HISTORY DOCUMENTATION PROJECT

Ronald Reagan Era, 1966-1974 Interviews Completed or In Process, May 1984

Single Interview Volumes

Beilenson, Anthony C., "Securing Liberal Legislation During the Reagan Administration," UC Los Angeles, 1982, 81 pp.

Burke, Yvonne Brathwaite, "New Arenas of Black Influence," UC Los Angeles, 1982, 46 pp.

Busterud, John A., "The California Constitution Revision Commission," Claremont, 1982, 37 pp.

Coke, J. Earl, "Reminiscences of People and Change in California Agriculture, 1900-1975," UC Davis, 1976, 265 pp.

Dales, Jack, "Pragmatic Leadership: Ronald Reagan as President of the Screen Actors Guild," UC Los Angeles, 1982, 49 pp.

Darling, Dick, "Republican Activism: The California Republican Assembly and Ronald Reagan," UC Los Angeles, 1981, 56 pp.

Dunckel, Earl B., "Ronald Reagan and the General Electric Theatre, 1954-1955," UC Berkeley, 1982, 46 pp.

Dunne, George H., "Christian Advocacy and Labor Strife in Hollywood," UC Los Angeles, 1981, 67 pp.

Finch, Robert H., "Views From the Lieutenant Governor's Office," CSU Fullerton, 1983, 107 pp.

Flournoy, Houston I., "California Assemblyman and Controller," Claremont, 1982, 235 pp.

Livermore, Norman B., Jr., "Man in the Middle: High Sierra Packer,

Timberman, Conservationist, and California Resources Secretary," UC Berkeley, 1983, 285 pp.

Plog, Stanley, "More than Just an Actor: The Early Campaigns of Ronald Reagan," UC Los Angeles, 1981, 29 pp.

Reagan, Neil, "Private Dimensions and Public Images: The Early Political Campaigns of Ronald Reagan," UC Los Angeles, 1981, 58 pp.

Riles, Wilson C., '"No Adversary Situations': Public School Education in California and Wilson C. Riles, Superintendent of Public Instruction, 1970-1982," DC Berkeley, 1984, 134 pp.

Younger, Evelle J., "A Lifetime in Law Enforcement," UC Los Angeles, 1982, 60 pp.

Multi- Interview Vo lume s

APPOINTMENTS, CABINET MANAGEMENT, AND POLICY RESEARCH FOR GOVERNOR RONALD REAGAN, 1967-1974, UC Berkeley, 1983, 232 pp.

Adams, Winfred, "Strategies for Republican Elections, State Government

Management, and Water Resources, 1963-1976." Haerle, Paul R., "Ronald Reagan and Republican Party Politics in

California, 1965-1968."

Martin, Jerry C., "Information and Policy Research for Ronald Reagan, 1969-1975."

THE ART OF CORRECTIONS MANAGEMENT, CALIFORNIA 1967-1974, UC Berkeley, 1984, 146 pp.

Breed, Allen F., "Theory and Practice in Juvenile Justice."

Procunier, Raymond K., "Administering Your Prisons."

THE ASSEMBLY, THE STATE SENATE, AND THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE, 1958-1974, UC Berkeley, 1982, 490 pp.

Bagley, William, "Some Complexities of Social Progress and Fiscal

Reform." Mills, James R., "A Philosophical Approach to Legislative and Election

Realities, 1959-1981." Monagan, Robert T., "Increasing Republican Influence in the State

Assembly." Rodda, Albert, "Sacramento Senator: State Leadership in Education and

Finance."

THE HISTORY OF PROPOSITION #1: PRECURSOR OF CALIFORNIA TAX LIMITATION

MEASURES, Claremont, 1982, 102 pp.

Stubblebine, William Craig, "The Development of Proposition #1." Uhler, Lewis K., "Chairman of Task Force in Tax Reduction."

ISSUES AND INNOVATIONS IN THE 1966 REPUBLICAN GUBERNATORIAL CAMPAIGN,

UC Berkeley, 1980, 187 pp.

Nofziger, Franklyn C., "Press Secretary for Ronald Reagan, 1966." Parkinson, Gaylord B., "California Republican Party Official, 1962-1967." Roberts, William E., "Professional Campaign Management and the

Candidate, 1960-1966." Spencer, Stuart K., "Developing a Campaign Management Organization."

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THE "KITCHEN CABINET": FOUR CALIFORNIA CITIZEN ADVISERS OF RONALD REAGAN. CSU Fullerton, 1983, 157 pp.

Dart, Justin

Mills, Edvard

Salvatori, Henry

Tuttle, Holmes

LEGISLATIVE-GOVERNOR RELATIONS IN THE REAGAN YEARS: FIVE VIEWS, CSU

Fullerton, 1983, 157 pp.

Carpenter, Dennis E., "Republican State Committee Chair and

Senator."

Beverly, Robert, "Reflections of a Republican Assemblyman." Zenovich, George, "Senate Democrat in the Reagan Government." Moretti, Robert, "Recollections of an Assembly Speaker." Cologne, Gordon, "Water Policy in the Reagan Years."

LEGISLATIVE ISSUE MANAGEMENT AND ADVOCACY, 1961-1974, UC Berkeley, 1983, 315 pp. Cory, Ken, "Education Consultant and Assemblyman, 1961-1974." Hall, Kenneth, "'Playing Devil's Advocate1: The Governor's Office and

The Department of Finance in California, 1966-1974." Kehoe, John, "Advocacy for Education, Consumerism, and Governor Ronald

Reagan, 1966-1974." Miller, John, "Issues of Criminal Justice and Black Politics in

California, 1966-1974." Sturgeon, Vernon, "State Senator, Reagan Advisor, and PUC Commissioner,

1960-1974."

ORGANIZATIONAL AND FISCAL VIEWS OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, UC Berkeley, 1984, 183 pp.

Post, A. Alan, "Public Aims and Expenditure: A Divergent View." King, Warren, "Governor Reagan's Use of Task Forces and Loaned

Executives, 1966-1968." Volk, Robert, Jr., "Government Reform and the Maturity of the Political

Process." Lucas, Harry, "New Approaches to Vocational Rehabilitation."

REPUBLICAN PHILOSOPHY AND PARTY ACTIVISM, UC Berkeley, 1984, 142 pp.

Hume, Jaquelin , "Basic Economics and the Body Politic: Views of a

Northern California Reagan Loyalist." Storrs, Eleanor Ring, "Parties, Politics, and Principles: 'It's at the

Local Level.'"

Wrather, Jack, "On Friendship, Politics, and Government." del Junco, Tirso, "California Republican Party Leadership and

Success, 1966-1982."

SAN FRANCISCO REPUBLICANS, UC Berkeley, 1980, 100 pp.

Christopher, George, "Mayor of San Francisco and Republican Party

Candidate." Weinberger, Caspar, "California Assembly, Republican State Central

Committee, and Elections, 1953-1966."

VI 1

In Process

Beck, Paul, UC Berkeley.

Boas, Roger, UC Berkeley.

Brian, Earl, UC Berkeley.

Carleson, Robert, UC Berkeley.

Cristina, Vernon, UC Berkeley.

Deaver, Michael, UC Berkeley.

Dwight, James, UC Berkeley.

Ellingwood, Herbert, UC Berkeley.

Gillenwaters, Ed, UC Berkeley.

Gleason, Verne E., "A Career Civil Servant Views State Social Welfare Policy

and Practices," UC Berkeley. Gunterman, Joseph, UC Berkeley. Hannaford, Peter, UC Berkeley. Jenkins, James, UC Berkeley. Johnson, Gardiner, UC Berkeley. Knox, John T., "Bay Area Regional Organization, the Environmental Quality

Act, and Related Issues in the California Assembly, 1960-1980," UC

Berkeley.

Livingston, Donald, UC Berkeley. Luce, Gordon C., UC Berkeley. Marinissen, Jan, UC Berkeley. McDowell, Jack, UC Berkeley. Meese, Edwin, III, UC Berkeley. Orr, Verne, UC Berkeley. Palumbo, Anthony, UC Berkeley. Randolph, Florence, UC Berkeley. Reagan, Ronald, UC Berkeley. Sherriffs, Alex C., UC Berkeley. Thomas, Edwin L., UC Berkeley. Todd, A. Ruric, UC Berkeley, looker, John S., "Director of the Office of Planning and Research, and

Legislative Assistant, 1967-1974," UC Berkeley. Walker, Robert, UC Berkeley. Walton, Frank, UC Berkeley. Walton, Rus, UC Berkeley, Warren, Charles, UC Berkeley. Watson, Philip E., UC Los Angeles. Watts, Norman, UC Berkeley. Williams, Spencer M., "The Human Relations Agency: Perspectives and Programs

Concerning Health, Welfare, and Corrections, 1966-1970," UC Berkeley. Wright, Donald R., CSU Fullerton Zumbrun, Ronald A., "Social Welfare Reform from Task Force to Trial Court,

1970-1973," UC Berkeley.

viii

Participating Institutions

Oral History Office, Department of Special Collections, University of California, Davis, California, 95616.

Oral History Program, Library 243, California State University, Fullerton, California, 92634.

Oral History Program, Claremont Graduate School, Claremont, California, 91711.

Oral History Program, Powell Library Building, University of California, Los Angeles, California, 90024.

Regional Oral History Office, 486 The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, California, 94720.

Ix

INTRODUCTION

In Republican Philosophy and Party Activism, Jaquelin Hume, Eleanor Ring Storrs, Jack Wrather and Tirso del Junco discuss their long-time philosophical affinity for Ronald Reagan and the Republican party. All four interviewees for this current volume in the Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era oral history project speak from long acquaintance with Reagan and with other notable California Republicans .

In "Basic Economics and the Body Politic: Views of a Northern California Reagan Loyalist," Hume considers his early political activities in the National Republican Congressional Campaign Committee, the 1952 Citizens for Eisenhower presidential campaign, and the 1954 Eisenhower Congressional Committee. Hume became active again in politics when he was the Northern California Finance Chairman for Barry Goldwater, Sr. in the 1963-1964 period, and only then because Goldwater "typified the political philosophy" which Hume supported. This organi zational work for Eisenhower and Goldwater set the stage for the long-term commitment which Hume made to the party's newcomer, Ronald Reagan, beginning in 1964 and continuing to the present day. As do the other interviewees included here, Hume makes cameo notes about Republican party leaders Richard Nixon, William Knowland, and others, who parried for power within the party against Reagan during his California years .

It is in his discussion of his work with the Reagan 1966 gubernatorial campaign, and the transition period of Reagan's governorship through 1967, that Hume elucidates his philosophy of the party and party adherents in action; and the need for efficiency in state government overall and adequate personnel to insure that efficiency. Hume credits himself with the establishment of what informally became known as the "loaned executive program" in which advisors to the new governor sought out management personnel from various California firms to fill key appointive vacancies in the Reagan administration. Hume concludes that these advisors were looking for "people who would do a good job... and who were philosophically dedicated to a private enterprise, conserva tive, profit-oriented society." Hume comments further on the theme of efficiency in state government with notes on the success of the Governor's Survey on Efficiency and Cost Control, the 1967-68 task force which became a hallmark of Governor Reagan's interest in ways to trim unnecessary state expenses and operations .

In his observations on California political campaigns and elections, Hume presents the critical theme of local involvement and volunteer organization to supplement the formal party structure. (Storrs echoes this theme in her own oral history interview.) Further, in reflecting on fund raising, Hume remarks that that is different in the northern part of the Golden State, especially in San Francisco: "You have many people here who have inherited wealth. .. [and who] are not prepared to be as aggressive in supporting a controversial program as

some who have earned their wealth. Also, many people with inherited wealth seem to have a guilt complex about their inheritance and feel that they have an obligation to support liberal causes."

Throughout the interview, Hume keeps the importance of the development of political philosophy before him. In Reagan's case, this development progressed from his ideas generated while speaking for General Electric, through his years as governor, and culminated in the presidency.

In "Parties, Politics, and Principle: It's at the Local Level," Eleanor Ring Storrs chronicles the twin themes of her philosophy about the correct role of women in politics (as volunteers working on the local level) and her support for Ronald Reagan as a political and philosophical leader (starting with his earliest affiliation with Republicans as a tentative gubernatorial candidate supported by Citizens for Constructive Action).

Within Storrs 's discussion of her own efforts in the Republican party are the history of operations in San Diego County (both the Women's Federation and the main county structure), as well as notes on the 1964, 1968, and 1972 Republican national conventions, and on the Republican National Committee. Storrs's involvement in local politics began with her opposition to the construction of the controversial Coronado Bridge in 1957-1958. As a result of this action, she became a member of the Coronado Republican Women's Club, and so of the San Diego County Federation of Republican Women. As with Hume, Storrs refers to other notable California politicos; she confirms the importance of Lucile Hosmer and Marjorie Benedict among the leadership of Republican women around the state. Readers may be interested to see Hosmer 's and Benedict's own interviews in the California Women Political Leaders series, also a project of the Regional Oral History Office.

As part of her notes on Republican national politics, Storrs recalls her participation in the 1972 national convention. In early summer the convention was moved from its scheduled site of San Diego to Miami Beach, Florida, because of a sensitive political situation with allegations of corporate contributions to the first site. Although this move absolved her of major responsibility for convention plans, Storrs immediately stepped in to assist national committee- woman from Florida Paula Hawkins, later Senator Hawkins. As with many of her political anecdotes, Storrs combines humorous sidelights with remarks on significant activities. While finishing last-minute details on the convention floor, Hawkins and Storrs were treated to Ethel Merman's rehearsal of her performance for the delegates : "Paula and I both sat down and there she sang for an hour or so — you know, 'let's do it again, a little faster here, a little slow there' .. .then both of us got up and just clapped like crazy!" In the next paragraph, Storrs recalls representing Governor Reagan at a late-night meeting of Republican governors who were discussing convention platform issues; she took a conservative stance. This was one of many instances where Storrs stood in for Reagan, "because we have always thought along the same lines, you know what I mean?"

xi

Also included in this volume is an interview with Jack Wrather, "On Friendship, Politics, and Government." Wrather remembers his work and support for Ronald Reagan from the years when they were friends while both worked in the movie industry in Los Angeles. In this summary sketch, Wrather begins with dinner party discussions held shortly after Barry Goldwater, Sr.'s defeat in his 1964 presidential campaign: "[Wje'd sit and discuss what the hell happened to Barry, why, and how terrific that commercial [the famous speech "A Time for Choosing"] was of Ron's." He relates how these friends, some of whom later became the kitchen cabinet, then encouraged Reagan to run for governor. As do the other interviewees in this volume, and many in this series, Wrather keeps his eyes focused on Reagan in his current position. He recalls Reagan's national efforts while viewing the Nixon, Ford, and Carter presidential nominations and administrations in retrospect. Wrather concludes this section of the interview by drawing a straight line from the 1966 guberna torial campaign to the presidential transition in 1980; he includes himself among those who have been faithful to Reagan's goals and efforts over these years .

Besides his discussion of assisting Reagan in his campaign, Wrather thought fully considers his candidate's ideas about government, economics, and proper business principles, beginning with 1966: "We thought they were the right ideas [which Reagan had] and that they would win the day because the other ideas that we were fighting were such dormant, archaic kinds of ideas in regard to government finances and fiscal policy and everything. . .We happened to be correct, and that was that." And, further on, "...Ron himself is a very good businessman, a good business brain... he understands that... you can't spend more money than you've got very long without going broke, unless you've got a rich uncle who's supporting you, like the government has been supporting everybody."

An interview with Tirso del Junco concludes this volume. Del Junco came from Cuba to the United States around 1960; he now maintains a busy medical practice in Los Angeles. He too came to know Reagan from the 1964 Goldwater campaign, and their acquaintance developed during del Junco 's years in the party's hierarchy which included chairmanship of the Republican State Central Committee in 1981-82. In the interview del Junco discusses the party's increasing effectiveness in raising campaign funds, and in getting Republicans to vote. He also notes his own success in building a strong Hispanic presence within the party, including the establishment of the Hispanic Council.

Del Junco shares the enthusiasm for Ronald Reagan, his philosophy and leadership, that the other interviewees in this volume express. While del Junco focuses primarily on Reagan as president and the leadership which he has brought to this position, del Junco also credits Reagan with leading the Republican party in California to a higher, more unified plane. "He has been our leader," del Junco remarks to the interviewer, "but he has not been a controversial leader. He has been a clean, faithful leader, upfront at all times . "

xii

A special privilege which oral history in political documentation presents lies in the opportunity to discuss "the great man," in both theory and person, with those who worked around him — in earlier careers, in campaigns and previous administrations, in admiring friendships and in adversarial relationships. This volume samples those who worked with Reagan in his California years. Other volumes in the Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era series contribute addi tional portraits of Reagan himself and of those persons who worked with him, or who participated in issues critical to the 1966-1974 period in California state government history.

There are a few notes to record regarding the procedures involved in the conduct of these interviews. Jaquelin Hume was interviewed on 26 January 1982, Eleanor Ring Storrs on 15 February 1983, Jack Wrather on 30 September 1982, and Tirso del Junco on 30 November 1982. The interviewers sent session outlines to these interviewees ahead of time, and returned the roughly edited interview transcripts to them for their review and corrections . The inter viewees varied in their approaches to this review process: Hume, Wrather and del Junco made very few editorial changes in their transcripts, while Storrs answered additional questions and cleared up several vague passages.

Sarah Sharp Interviewer-Editor

12 March 1984

Regional Oral History Office

486 The Bancroft Library

University of California at Berkeley

Regional Oral History Office University of California

The Bancroft Library Berkeley, California

Government History Documentation Project Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era

Jaquelin Hume

BASIC ECONOMICS AND THE BODY POLITIC: VIEWS OF A NORTHERN CALIFORNIA REAGAN LOYALIST

An Interview Conducted by Gabrielle Morris in 1982

Copyright (c^ 1984 by the Regents of the University of California

JAQUELIN H. HUME

TABLE OF CONTENTS — Jaquelin Hume

I PERSONAL BACKGROUND, POLITICAL CONCERNS 1

Building a Business in Food Processing 1

Support for Nixon and Eisenhower in the 1950s 4 The Goldwater 1964 Campaign

Northern and Southern California Political Attitudes 11

II ELECTING RONALD REAGAN GOVERNOR 14

Getting to Know the Candidate 14

Building Support 18

The 1966 Campaign 20

George Christopher's Primary Race 22

III CLEANING HOUSE FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION 25

Work of the Appointments Committee 25

Task Force on Government Efficiency and Economy 30

IV OBSERVING REAGAN AS GOVERNOR: PRESIDENTIAL POTENTIAL 35

Serving as Chief of Protocol 35

Staying in Touch with the Governor's Office 37

Republican Party Matters 39

Ideas from the General Electric Years 44

TAPE GUIDE 50

INDEX 51

I PERSONAL BACKGROUND; POLITICAL CONCERNS [Interview 1: January 26, 1982 ]##

Building a Business in Food Processing

Morris: I would like to begin by asking you a little bit about your personal background. The name Hume is an interesting, unusual one. As I asked you when I wrote, I wonder if you are related to James Hume of Wells Fargo Express?

Hume: No, I am not. I have no near Hume relatives in California. I think that many Humes in this country are descended from a Hume who came to America in about 1740 but they have spread out quite widely. My father was an only son of an only son, so that I have no close rela tives on my father's side.

Morris: Did your father come to California?

Hume: My father and mother moved to California in 1920. We lived in Pasadena. Father remained there until his death in 1950.

Morris: Then you, yourself, grew up in southern California?

Hume: Yes, after the age of 15. My early years were in Indianapolis where

////This symbol indicates that a tape or a segment of a tape has begun or ended. For a guide to the tapes see page 50.

Hume: Father and Mother had been born. I was actually born in Michigan when my mother was there one summer .

Morris : Then your education was in southern California?

Hume: No. It was in the east. I went to Phillips Exeter Academy in New Hampshire and then to Princeton. After that I went to Harvard Business School.

Morris: How did you happen to locate here in the Bay Area?

Hume: My brother, William Hume, and I decided we would like to start our own business. After examining many possibilities we chose the business of dehydrating vegetables. With the aid of a chemical engineer we developed a new process in a laboratory we set up in the basement of our father's garage in Pasadena. In the summer of 1933 we went to Vacaville to try out the dehydration process using a prune dryer which we were able to rent. The process was commercially satisfactory so we continued to rent the prune dryer several years. Later we bought property in Vacaville and we still have an important plant there. It was our headquarters until we moved to San Francisco after the Second World War.

Morris: So your ties are with the basic agriculture industry here in Cali fornia?

Hume: Yes, and in other states, although we are processors and not growers of agricultural products. We began dehydrating onion and garlic in Vacaville and processed these vegetables almost exclusively until after the Second World War. Because of the large dehydration capacity we had created to satisfy wartime demand, we tried our hands

Hume :

Morris ;

Hume:

Morris: Hume:

Morris : Hume : Morris :

at several other vegetables in the late 40s, but finally went back to onion and garlic exclusively. Accordingly dehydrating these two vegetables has been the business of Basic Vegetable Products, Inc., since we started the company almost fifty years ago.

In 1955 we set up a new company in Idaho to make a dehydrated potato powder. That company is the American Potato Company. In 1974-75 we merged Basic and American into AMPCO Foods, Inc. Was it your business concerns that first led you to become active in politics and public affairs?

No, I was disturbed by the kind of government we had in our country, particularly at the national level, and wanted to see if I could do something to improve its quality. I also was very upset by the Roosevelt program which I felt was socializing many activities in our country. I hoped that I could make some contribution toward reversing this trend. As early as the 1930s?

No, I became completely disillusioned when Roosevelt ran for a third term in 1940. You could say that my political conservatism dates from that election since I voted for Roosevelt in 1932 and 1936. Because of the economic conditions? Yes, I hoped he would improve conditions.

In 1940 the California state economy was in pretty bad shape if I remember correctly. That is when Culbert Olson was governor. You were not particularly involved in state politics?

Support for Nixon and Eisenhower in the 1950s

Hume: No, I did not take significant part in political activities until

I guess, the Nixon campaign. I met him when he was running for U.S. Senator in 1950 and was quite impressed.

Morris: This is when he ran against Helen Gahagan Douglas?

Hume: Yes, that is right.

Morris: Was your support for Nixon because you were concerned with Mrs. Douglas?

Hume: Yes, that was one reason. I also thought Nixon was a very able young man and had done a remarkably good job in uncovering communist activity that was being very harmful to our country.

Morris: At that point in 1950 were you working through the Republican party or was it an ad hoc Nixon effort?

Hume: I suppose it was an ad hoc effort. I have always been more candidate oriented than I have been party oriented.

Morris: Was there a northern California kind of steering group that you were part of in 1950?

Hume: Not in 1950. In 1952 I became part of the Citizens for Eisenhower and had a principal position in the northern California group. I went to the convention in Chicago that year and worked with the Citizens for Eisenhower group and with Nixon to promote the nomina tion of Eisenhower rather than Taft. This was the first convention I attended. I worked quite closely with Nixon, whom I had seen several times in Washington to discuss the strategy our group should follow.

Hume: In 1954 I went to Washington as a deputy head of the national

Citizens for Eisenhower Congressional Committee. Our committee tried to elect congressional candidates who were favorable to Eisenhower.

Morris: At that point was it primarily a matter of raising enough money so that the Eisenhower people could feed it out to what they thought were likely candidates?

Hume: No. My effort was not directed toward fundraising but rather at trying to get good candidates to run in various congressional districts, candidates who supported Eisenhower's philosophy.

Morris: In 1954 how did you go about deciding which districts were likely, districts to — ?

Hume: Well, there were perhaps forty districts where the Democrats had been elected by very narrow margins in 1952. There were also quite a few Republican districts where the Republican had been elected by a narrow margin. We zeroed in primarily on Democratic districts and tried to get a strong candidate to run against the incumbent. Our committee had money to help these candidates. Then we supported other Republican incumbents who were threatened, provided we approved of their philosophy and thought we could help them.

Morris: That sounds like the ancestor to the California Plan which was so successful in the 60s. Did you have a staff person who was doing the statistical research to pick out the districts and develop — ?

Hume: I did a good deal of this. We had quite a large group of people in Washington, but they were working more on organizing rallies and on fundraising and other activities to promote the candidates whom we

Hume: had chosen. On the other hand I spent a good deal of time with the National Republican Congressional Campaign Committee which had re markably complete files on each congressional district including potential candidates there who were rated for their weaknesses and their strengths.

Morris: They had been developing this file over some period of time?

Hume: Yes, indeed.

Morris: That is a very special skill. Who was responsible for building up that kind of file?

Hume: I suppose some of this was done by the Republican National Committee, itself, but the majority had been done by the staff of the Congres sional Campaign Committee.

Morris: Did you suggest that this kind of an idea be tried in California in relation to the California legislature?

Hume: No, I did not get into that at all. I became quite disillusioned in 1954 with what we were doing. So much of the money that had been raised for our committee, amounting to over $1,000,000, was wasted on activities I thought were not going to help the election of good candidates. Such a large amount was wasted on overhead before the actual campaigns began that very little was left to give to the candidates. After about five months in Washington and two or three months before the election I left the Washington operation and came home .

The Goldwater 1964 Campaign

Hume: I did not take any part in politics again until Goldwater came on the horizon. He typified the political philosophy of which I approved and accordingly I began to support him.

Morris: Why did you skip Nixon's campaign in 1960?

Hume: This came at a time when I was taking no part in politics. Also, by this time I was no longer too enthusiastic about Nixon.

Morris: Did you feel that Goldwater and his people had tighter control of expenses during his campaign than Eisenhower?

Hume: Money raising for Goldwater was much more difficult than for Eisen hower. He had no funds to waste. I was the Northern California Finance Chairman for Goldwater and in addition really organized the northern California political activity. At the beginning I knew of only one other Goldwater supporter. After a few weeks we gradually found others.

Morris: Who was your fellow — ?

Hume: He was named Robert Steel and was a member of the local Republican Central Committee.

Morris: In San Francisco?

Hume : Yes .

Morris: You mean in 1963-64?

Hume: I think it must have been 1963 or 1964.

Morris: There were only two of you at one point who were willing to stand up for Goldwater?

Hume : Yes .

Morris: Why was that do you suppose?

Hume: Well I found that Rockefeller had sent an able representative around this part of California to talk to the heads of business and the heads of the banking fraternity. He had either gotten them to agree to support Rockefeller or agree at least not to oppose him. As a result when I tried to find prominent northern Californians to join the Goldwater movement I found that I had been pretty well foreclosed from getting support from any of the normal sources of funds.

Morris: He had already talked to the people you would normally talk to on something like this? How did he manage to steal the march on you?

Hume: Rockefeller's representative was able to speak to bankers and

businessmen with an authority which I completely lacked. He was more knowledgeable and also better equipped for his job than I was. His representative was an attractive and able man whose job was to organize northern Californians for Rockefeller. I assume he probably did the same thing in other parts of the country. He was able to seal off a large portion of community leaders from support ing Goldwater even though they were in favor of the philosophy Goldwater advocated.

Morris: He moved much earlier than you were used to getting started — ?

Hume: Well, I did not have any background on how to handle a presidential campaign in northern California. I was starting off from scratch.

Morris: I see. Even though you had done considerable campaign organizing for Eisenhower?

Hume: In the Eisenhower program we were trying to work in the pre-primary period to get as many people was we could to support Eisenhower.

Hume: We particularly tried to get the [Earl] Warren delegates to agree that they would support Eisenhower if Warren released to them. I went around northern California to see most of the Warren delegates to ask them to agree to become Eisenhower supporters if they were released by Warren.

Morris: Were you in touch with Bill [William F.] Knowland at all?

Hume: Yes, certainly, I was in touch with him, although I saw much less of Knowland than Nixon, since Knowland wanted the Warren delegates to agree to support him or Taft if they were released by Warren.

Morris: There was some question at that point — some of the Warren people have told us that they thought Warren had a fairly good chance in 1952 if they could hold off past the first ballot. There was some question of whether Bill Knowland helped that effort or whether Bill Knowland was hoping that he, himself, might end up as a compromise vice-presidential candidate or presidential candidate. From the people you were in touch with, did Mr. Knowland have any possibility of emerging as a national candidate?

Hume: I think so. Nixon, however, was covertly trying to get the Warren delegates to agree to back Eisenhower without Knowland knowing about this.

Morris: Why was it that you felt that the Nixon forces were a better pos sibility in that case?

Hume: The Citizens for Eisenhower had no ties to a political party and were only trying to help Eisenhower. Accordingly they were good people for Nixon to use.

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Hume: I knew Nixon quite well and believed he was an excellent adviser on what to do politically. He, of course, knew California politics well because he had been elected U.S. Senator in 1950. He was a potent figure, not so strong as Knowland perhaps, but a very potent figure and also a great Eisenhower supporter. We always felt that Knowland probably favored Taft rather than Eisenhower, but favored Knowland first. I found him difficult to work with.

Morris: I gather that your feeling was that a conservative approach to

government was better. I thought Mr. Taft was more conservative than Mr. Eisenhower.

Hume: I supported Eisenhower rather than Taft and lived to regret it very much. I suppose this was part of my development. I came to the conclusion when I was in Washington in 1954 that I had made a mistake. One reason I backed away from continuing to support Eisenhower was that he approved a very large federal deficit. I felt that he was not carrying out the swing away from the Roosevelt New Deal programs that I thought was needed for our country.

Morris: Was it the social programs of Roosevelt?

Hume: Both social and spending. They are, of course, related. I was also opposed to socialistic programs like the TVA.

Morris: How about the aspect of increased government regulation of business?

Hume: I do not believe that was much of a factor in shaping my opinion. I did not, however, approve of government intruding itself into the market place any more than was necessary to establish rules to make sure that the economic game was played fairly.

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Morris: That certainly has been a subject for much debate over the years. So you were involved with Mr. Goldwater before the convention. Then did you stay active in his campaign for the presidency?

Hume: Oh, yes. I was a delegate for Goldwater and attended the conven tion, and was quite active in it. I do not remember whether I was Northern California chairman after the convention, but I was certainly a very active figure in the Goldwater program in our part of the state. That was the way I got to know some of the individuals in southern California who later became principal supporters of Reagan.

Northern and Southern California Political Attitudes

Morris: I had wondered if in the vegetable processing business you might have had an opportunity to get to know some of the people in southern California?

Hume: No, I, however, had many friends in southern California since I

had lived there for a long time. But the people who were the heads of the Goldwater program in southern California were also the statewide heads of the Goldwater for President effort. Neverthe less, I was able to run things pretty independently in northern California including raising funds.

Morris: Some of those people, Holmes Tuttle and Henry Salvatori, had not come to California until the '30s or '40s and after you were pretty much up in northern California.

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Hume: Yes, and I had not known them before 1964. Then we got to know one

another during the Goldwater campaign. Morris: There is a lot made, in talking about politics in California,

about the north versus the south. Have you found that to be a

factor in developing some of these statewide programs? Hume: I was always jealous of the south's ability to raise money, and

came to the conclusion that we could raise about a third as much

here as they could raise in southern California. Morris: Really?

Hume: That is still true today. That is about the way it goes. Morris: Why is that? Hume: There is more money there and more people prepared to give and

more enthusiasm. Morris: Your sense is, aside from the fact that for the last ten years

there has been more population in southern California, they are

more likely to become active in — ? Hume: There are also many more conservatives; this is a pretty liberal

community here. Morris: In terms of money, I think of San Francisco as being kind of the

core of the banking, insurance, and money business of the state.

Does that not outweigh the airplane construction, movie, and oil

money in the south? Hume: No, not even remotely in terms of the availability of funds to

support anything I know on a statewide basis. Morris: The people in the south are willing to put their money where their

mouths are?

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Hume: Yes, and it is much easier to get people who are prepared to work hard on a conservative, political cause in the south than it is in the north. It is difficult to find conservative individuals in the north.

Morris: That is interesting. Why do you suppose that is so? Have you given that matter any thought?

Hume: I think San Francisco has always been a liberal town. It has been a town that was rather labor-dominated. You have many people here who have inherited wealth. I think individuals with inherited wealth frequently are not prepared to be as aggressive in supporting a controversial program as some who have earned their wealth. Also, many people with inherited wealth seem to have a guilt complex about their inheritance and feel that they have an obligation to society to support liberal causes.

Morris: That sounds like a very sound evaluation of the situation.

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II ELECTING RONALD REAGAN GOVERNOR

Getting to Know the Candidate

Morris: Let's turn to Mr. Reagan. You first met him in 1965 or so?

Hume: I did not know him at the time of his excellent speech for Goldwater. That speech was a principal reason the Goldwater campaign was able to survive since it raised a great deal of money. Three individuals I had gotten to know well in the Goldwater campaign, namely, Henry Salvatori, Cy Rubel, who was the head of Union Oil, and Holmes Tuttle, were enthusiastic about Ronald Reagan. I had gotten to know Salvatori quite well and I also knew Holmes Tuttle fairly well. I knew Cy Rubel only slightly. These three called on Ronald Reagan to ask him if he would be a candidate for governor. They promised that they would support him financially if he ran. I believe that after considerable discussion he agreed that he would consider being a candidate.

Reagan felt he should talk to someone in northern California and asked the three whom he should see. They tell me that they suggested he should call on me. He did, and we talked for an hour

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Hume: or two in San Francisco. After this conversation I was enthusiastic about Ronald Reagan's potential as a candidate for governor and agreed that I would support his campaign. I offered to arrange for him to meet the conservatives I knew in northern California. The first meeting I arranged was a breakfast attended by seven of us who had been active in the Goldwater campaign. They were all sub stantial local citizens, and they were the nucleus on which we built the Reagan campaign in northern California.

Morris: Do you recall who it was you invited to that breakfast meeting?

Hume: One was Sherman Chickering. Others were Mrs. Marshall Madison and Malcolm Cravens. I believe I also had Gardiner Johnson and Leland Kaiser.

Morris: Would you have brought someone like Cap Weinberger into a meeting like that? He had been active in the party.

Hume: We did not regard Cap as a conservative at that time. In the

causes which he supported on his radio program he was on the liberal side quite often.

Morris: You were looking for conservatives rather than that sort of broad Republican — ?

Hume: Yes. For me to get people to support Ron it was necessary that they feel comfortable with his philosophy. I could not very well say, "Here is a fine man who will make an excellent candidate and I want you to support him."

Morris: What kind of things did you and he talk about when he came up to see you when he was testing the idea?

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Hume: I think we talked about his philosophy of the relationship of

government to the individual, the relationship he visualized of the federal government to the government of the state, and the kind of people he would seek out in filling various offices in the state. I was also interested in his view on economics.

Morris : You talked about that as early as when he was exploring the possi bility of running?

Hume: I believe so. All these are extremely important in determining the kind of governor or public official an individual is likely to be. The kind of people he is going to bring into the government to assist him is also most important.

Morris: Did you raise these subjects or did he raise them?

Hume: I cannot tell you.

Morris: What was the concern particularly about what kind of people should be brought into the staff?

Hume: We wanted people who were not primarily politicians. We wanted

individuals who were dedicated to a philosophy of having as efficient and effective a government as possible. We did not want individuals to be employed because of political support but rather have them chosen for their quality. We also wanted individuals who believed our country should have less government rather than more and who had sound fiscal ideas. After all, the state was in a serious financial condition. [Governor Edmund G.] Brown [Sr.] had been balancing the budget by gimmicks, such as speeding up the collec tion of taxes, which had only a one-time effect. Spending in the state was running $1,000,000 a day over income.

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Morris: Did Mr. Reagan bring somebody with him to the meeting in your office?

Hume : No .

Morris: He just hopped on a plane and came up here to meet you?

Hume: I guess so.

Morris: What appealed to you about him? How did he strike you on that

initial first—? Hume: Very appealing. I thought he was just as sound as he could be.

He advocated the political and economic philosophy of which I ap

proved and he seemed to have the ability to express it even better

than Goldwater. Morris: What kind of response did you get from the breakfast group that you

invited to that meeting?

Hume: They were enthusiastic, all of them. All did work for him. Morris: Had you been, kind of, looking for a candidate to support and develop? Hume: Not actively, I would say, no. Morris: But you recognized someone with potential? Hume : Yes .

Morris: Was your sense that Mr. Reagan was going to go ahead and run for office?

Hume: No. I hoped he would. I do not think he made up his mind until

after he had spent a fair amount of time going about the state and had some sense of the availability of money to support him.

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Building Support

Morris: Your sense is that he was doing this on his own. He did not have somebody suggesting to whom he might talk in this preliminary sounding?

Hume: I think he used individuals to make suggestions. I suggested names in northern California and our friends in southern California suggested sources of information there. I am sure that he also had contacts of his own.

Morris: When you are putting together this kind of statewide thing, are there people in the valley and in the mountain counties that you need to check with, too? Can you do it just with San Francisco and Los Angeles?

Hume: To some extent. You do not get much financial help flowing into the San Francisco area from outside the area. You do not even get much help from Oakland. Support comes primarily from San Francisco and the Peninsula and, to a lesser extent, Marin County. Quite a few people who had been in the Goldwater campaign, who lived in Contra Costa and Alameda areas, we were able to bring into the campaign.

Morris: In terms of putting together a campaign, you feel you can do it with good financial support in San Francisco and Los Angeles?

Hume: I should say so, yes.

Morris: In terms of actually running a campaign, don't you need people in all areas of the state?

Hume: Of course you do. You have to be very sure they feel that they are a significant part of the campaign.

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Morris: I understand that has become more difficult as the cost of campaigns has risen. Robert Monagan, who was speaker of the assembly for a while under Reagan's governorship, commented that as campaigns have gotten more expensive, there is less work for individuals to do. Most of the money goes into media and less into the kind of envelope stuffing and individual contact that require a lot of people. Has that been your experience?

Hume: I cannot comment on that. I am sure that media is a heavy campaign expense. But you still, at least in any campaigns with which I have been associated, need a strong volunteer organization in the pre cincts that goes around and calls on people to promote the candidate and arranges a "get out the vote" program for election time and checks up on this program on election day. It is important to interest as many people in the precincts as possible. In campaigns with which I have been associated, that work usually is not done adequately by the Republican organization. That organization had to be developed by the candidate although the Republican organiza tion would offer some help. Morris: How about things like the Republican Assembly and the United

Republicans, did they turn out volunteers?

Hume: The Republican Assembly? I do not believe it was important. I think there is a conservative group here. I cannot tell you the names of the various groups. Morris: The Republican Assembly came to mind because Gardiner Johnson, I

believe, was active in that and had been very active in the Goldwater campaign.

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Hume: Gardiner was one of those who came to my breakfast, I think. Morris: Did they all sign on and work with you on the campaign? Hume: Yes, I think that we made ourselves into a sort of steering

committee.

Morris: At what point did Leland Kaiser come in? Hume: He came in early on. He may very well have been at this breakfast

too. He was active in the Goldwater campaign, and a fine worker.

I think he probably was at the breakfast.

The 1966 Campaign

Morris: Did the campaign go about as you expected it?

Hume: We were all delighted with Reagan's quality as a campaigner and

found him so much more able than we had anticipated. I will always remember that we urged him to set up various task forces to develop position papers for him, on the state parks, highways, prison, and on various other state problems.

The third or fourth time we had urged this he said, "I want to show you my homework." He went into his bedroom and brought out a stack of the reports put out annually by each one of the state departments. They were very elaborate documents in four colors and each gave a lot of information about what each department did.

He had gotten the reports going back several years, and was learning about each department and coming to his own decisions about what his position should be on their problems. This was typical of Ron.

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Morris : This was like the annual reports put out by the Highway Department and Department of Social Welfare?

Hume: Yes. These reports were under the Brown [Sr.] administration.

Morris: Somebody had gotten those for him?

Hume: I do not know how he obtained them, but they were his bedside reading.

Morris: Put you to sleep in a hurry. [laughter]

Hume: Yes. President Reagan has always had a phenomenal memory. He simply does not forget something he reads. Also, he is very accurate with figures. His problem is that sometimes people give him figures that are not accurate. He will remember the figures and rely on them.

He told us during the campaign, "You know, I think I am going to take questions from the floor the next time I make a speech."

We said, "Ron, that will be terribly dangerous. Brown is going to have a series of experts on different state problems in the audience and they will ask you questions that only someone who has been involved in a particular department could answer properly." Ron said, "I think I am ready to face that."

He did and Brown's people did ask him questions that were just as detailed as possible. The way he handled these questions emphasized his memory and the homework he had done. He only missed a couple of questions. One was the location of the Eel River which he missed by about one hundred miles. Another was an equally unim portant matter. When he answered these questions what he was saying was being recorded by representatives of Brown.

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Hume: He would say, "Oh, you are the man that is recording for Brown, aren't you? Come on up here in the front. You want to get this thing exactly." The Brown spy, who hoped he was making a recording of Ron's speech secretly, was most embarrassed when his mask was pulled off and he was on display taping the speech. Ron is very skillful handling matters of this kind.

This emphasizes an important reason I have been such an enthusiastic supporter of Ron. He is an extremely able individual, much more so than most people realize. This lack of appreciation for his mental ability was a problem when he ran for governor and even more of a problem when he ran for president. Most people had no comprehension that he had such an excellent mind.

George Christopher's Primary Race

Morris: Let me go back a minute to the primaries. Did your northern

California group have any problems during the primary when George Christopher, who had been mayor of San Francisco, was also running for the Republican nomination?

Hume: Of course. It was very difficult getting support in northern

California. I remember one of my good friends saying to me, "Jack, you are not considering supporting that actor when George Christopher is running for governor? What has gotten into you?"

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Hume: I said, "Well, I just think he would make a considerably better governor than Christopher would."

He said y "You can't really mean that," and was very sincere. Reagan did make a much better governor than Christopher would have. Since then my friend has become an enthusiastic Reagan supporter. In my opinion I think he was an excellent governor.

Morris: Did you have any concerns during the primary that Christopher might indeed get the nomination?

Hume: Oh, yes. It looked as though it was going to be a nip and tuck race. I think San Francisco was taken by Christopher and probably a fair part of northern California. But Ron won hands down on a broad statewide basis. Christopher was furious and refused to support Ron, and did not support him for some time. He felt that Ron had stolen the race from him in some way because there had been criticism of Christopher in connection with a milk scandal —

Morris: Milk pricing — ?

Hume: I am not sure about the grounds for the criticism but I am sure Ron had nothing to do with bringing up a matter of this kind as a campaign issue. This is not his style.

Morris: Christopher thought that the Reagan people had raised this?

Hume: He thought Ron was responsible for this thing coming up in the

campaign. Ron was not responsible in any way for it, because Ron simply does not function that way. He has a great belief in what he calls the Eleventh Commandment: "Never speak ill of other Republicans."

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Morris: That was Dr. [Gaylord] Parkinson's phrasing, I think.

Hume: It may have been.

Morris: How closely did your group work with the Republican statewide organ ization in the "66 campaign?

Hume: I think pretty closely after the primary. You reminded me of

Parkinson. He was a quite effective state [party] chairman and one with whom we could work. Other state [party] chairmen had been more difficul: to work with.

Morris: Was Weinberger more difficult to work with? He had preceded Parkinson as chairman.

Hume: Weinberger was much more liberal than Parkinson. I think you would find that Weinberger was a supporter of Christopher.

Morris: I am not clear about that. What I was thinking of is his concern when he was chairman of the party about trying to bring together what he felt were fairly contentious rival groups of conservative to liberal viewpoints, each of which wanted to have control of the party rather than build an organization which could elect candidates. Do you remember any of that as a factor in your — ?

Hume : No , I do not .

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III CLEANING HOUSE FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION

Work of the Appointments Committee

Morris : At what point did the campaign advisers develop into an ongoing advisory group? You all seem to have been very much involved in the transition.

Hume: We began to have meetings with Ron. The one I told you about where he brought out his homework occurred in the early days of the campaign, I believe. We had meetings with Ron at his home, then at various other locations, dating from the preprimary on. We worked with him closely during the campaign, both people who were in the political campaign and those who worked on money raising.

Morris: You all sort of took it for granted that you would continue offering advice and suggestions?

Hume: No, I don't think so. Nevertheless we were, I think all of us,

interested in the question of the quality of personnel who would be brought into the state government. We felt this was extremely important and Ron knew how strongly we felt on this subject.

Morris: So it was kind of logical for you to assume some responsibility as an appointments committee to fill — ?

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Hume: Well, I suppose so. He had to get suggestions from somewhere. We

made it a first priority to try to find, all over the state, as able people as we possibly could for each of the spots in the state government with no regard at all to their support by the political organizations in the state. We were trying to find people who, if they took a political office, would do a good job rather than people with experience as political office holders.

Morris: You were looking for administrative skills?

Hume: And people who were philosophically dedicated to a private enterprise, conservative, profit-oriented society.

Morris: What were your priorities in filling spots for the new administration?

Hume: We wanted people who were philosophically in accord —

Morris: I was thinking in terms of the range of jobs. There are the agency

secretaries and department heads and the governor's immediate office, and all the various boards and commissions — from the Public Utilities Commission to the district fair boards and things like that. Did your committee cover all those categories of appointees?

Hume: Many commissions are not subject to appointment when a governor goes into office. They are sequential. We did interest ourselves in individuals who we thought would be good members of the governor's office. But the first job was to staff the principal positions in the state government as wisely as we could. We reached out for all kinds of people thoughout the state, most of whom had never held a political office before. They were individuals we thought were the most able we could find.

27

Morris: That is a point that has had quite a lot of discussion, I think. I gathered that when you were in the transition phase there were some people who drew up memos for how the government should function and expressed concern that there needed to be some people who did have experience in government, to kind of show the new people the ropes. Was that a subject of some discussion?

Hume: It may have been. I think our group did not agree with that. We felt that you do not get a clean house unless you clean house.

Morris: True. I gathered there were some problems, however, the first

couple of years that Mr. Reagan was in Sacramento, particularly with the legislature.

Hume: I think that was one of the errors that Ron made. I think he

underestimated the importance of the legislature. He learned the lesson very well, as shown by the way he handled the legislature in his later years when it was Democratically controlled. You do not just ride roughshod over legislatures.

Morris : Were there some people who had worked on legislative campaigns

feeding in suggestions and concerns about how you go about doing these things?

Hume: Worked on legislative campaigns? I don't know what you mean.

Morris: I mentioned the California Plan earlier. That had some people coordinating it, both in the legislature and some professional political campaign people. I wondered if they were in touch with Mr. Reagan and your group.

28

Hume: I don't know. I think that several of those who were responsible for the success of the California Plan, or whatever you call it, were also active supporters of Reagan. So I think there was a melding of those.

Morris: But the initial decision that was acted on, was that it was more

important to have people who were philosophically loyal and single- minded, rather than people who would listen to the — ?

Hume: I would not say singleminded, but had a philosophy that the best government is the least government, that you should not have government trying to solve the problems of society. After all, there is no such thing as "government" which exists apart from people. It is entirely made up of people. There is no body of government money that exists apart from taxpayers. All the money spent by the government comes from the people. Many have the idea that you can just turn a problem over to "government" and that an individual who has a public service job is endowed with higher morality and more intelligence than someone who has a private enterprise job. I think these are ideas that we have been taught and I do not believe them.

Morris: Was it seen as an opportunity to get some experience for some bright young men? I am struck by the youth of a lot of the people that were on the governor's staff initially.

Hume: The reason younger people were brought into the administration was not to give them experience. It was done because it is much easier to get able individuals to take a public job when they are younger

29

Hume: than when they are in middle or later life. When people are in

midcareer it is difficult for them to leave that career. Also, we wanted the energy and enthusiasm that you often do not get from older people. We certainly did not want to depend on people who had come up through the bureaucracy to continue to run the state, because they had been running it in ways which we did not feel were proper.

Morris: As the governorship went on, it looks as if there did come some

people out of the bureaucracy — career people in government who did turn out to be helpful.

Hume: Oh, yes. There are a lot of very good people in government, very conscientious. If someone at the top encourages such individuals in the bureaucracy to come forward with helpful programs and ideas by letting them know that they will not be in trouble if these ideas are not in line with what the department has always done, these people do come forward with excellent suggestions. Of course you are always looking for such people in a bureaucracy, because the best suggestions often come from people with experience in the way a department works .

Task Force on Government Efficiency and Economy

Morris: We mentioned task forces earlier on. I guess one of the first efforts of the new administration was to set up a task force on government efficiency and economy. Had you suggested that, and they said, "Okay, you can take it on "?

30

Hume: Exactly who brought the idea of task forces to Ron's attention I am not sure. It had been done in one or two other states previously. We were fascinated with this idea.

An individual from a state where it had been done came out to

talk to us and then we sent a representative back to the state to

* see the program at first-hand.

Morris: I see, and then brought that man out as a staff person?

Hume: I do not remember whether we brought him out as a staff person. We brought him out to tell us what was going on and to make sure that we benefitted from the errors and the wise moves that they had made.

Morris: How did you go about getting, what was it, one hundred and ten business executives to — ?

Hume : It was over two hundred .

Morris: Good heavens! That is an impressive number.

Hume: Yes, it is. The requirement was that they be top quality executives, that they be vice-presidents or higher and have very responsible jobs in their organizations, be highly regarded by their peers and that they be released without any qualification for six months. They had to stop their current jobs for six months. Employers all agreed that the individuals they loaned to the task force would not lose in their progress in their companies because they had spent six months or more in Sacramento.

*See Warren King, Governor Reagan's Use of Task Forces and Loaned Executives, 1966-1968, Regional Oral History Office, U.C. Berkeley, in progress.

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Morris : Would they continue to get their regular salaries from their employer?

Hume: Yes, as I recall, they were paid by the companies, although I do not remember exactly what was done.

Morris: I came across a comment that you were largely responsible for recruiting all those people.

Hume: I worked hard on recruiting people for the task force from northern California companies. It seemed to me such a sound way to improve state government. I talked to the chief executives of the big corporations in San Francisco about the program and suggested to each the number of people we would like to have them make available. It was not difficult to do this. You must remember that there was tremendous enthusiasm in the state for Governor Reagan at that time. It was clear that he was trying to bring efficiency into the state government and start with individuals who were not politically motivated.

Morris: Was it word of mouth or did you send out a questionnaire?

Hume: I think most of it was word of mouth. I talked to the heads of the telephone company and Standard Oil and various other organizations in town including the principal banks and told them what we wanted. I urged that participating in this program would be to their distinct advantage because people they lent should be more valuable employees when they came back from Sacramento. They would have had a first hand experience in the way government works that could not be obtained in any other fashion.

32

Morris: Let me ask you a lateral question. In developing your own business with your brother, did you spend a fair amount of time yourself dealing with various government regulations?

Hume: No, I had no dealing with government at all until the Second World War, when we built and expanded our plant with government money. We were the principal supplier of dehydrated onion and garlic for the military during the war —

Morris: A big responsibility.

Hume: — so that I had a lot of tie-in with the government people in that period. But that is the only experience I have had.

Morris: But you felt that personally that had been a beneficial experience?

Hume: I do not remember whether I thought of it that way or not. It was not hard in 1966 to convince the heads of large corporations that their organization, no matter what Ron did, was going to have a lot of contact with the state government. Accordingly it would be to their advantage to have people in their organization who knew some thing about how the California state government works from an inside view rather than entirely from the outside.

Morris: Did the people who agreed to send an executive person largely send somebody from public affairs, or did they send people from their financial and production?

Hume: No, we asked for people who had skills in the particular areas in which the task force proposed to work. For example, we wanted people who had skills in handling automobiles because the state has a huge fleet of cars. We wanted people with skills in purchasing,

33

Hume: in personnel management, in accounting, in the use of computers, in handling public recreation areas (such as Disneyland) , and in mass feeding and other things that tied into the operation of prisons. These people would be able to study particular phases of the activi ties in which the state was engaged with a background of how that particular kind of activity was handled most efficiently by private enterprise.

Morris: When you had to live by profit and loss statements?

Hume: Yes. For example, we had on the task force individuals who were responsible for allocating space in office buildings occupied by large employers such as the telephone company. They examined a plan to build two huge new state office buildings.

Morris: That was going to be a new state capitol, wasn't it?

Hume: No. These new buildings were to house the employees of various departments of the state.

On examination, the members of the task force found that the state was allocating about two and one half times the number of square feet in office buildings to each employee as was allocated in private enterprise. It was obvious that existing office space could be used much more efficiently. Accordingly, the state did not build these two new office buildings and actually I believe was able to rent to others some space it already had in Sacramento.

Morris: That has been a constant problem with government, I understand.

They either have too much space or too little. One of the things that occurs to me from looking backwards at it, is that if you send

34

Morris: businessmen in, presumably they might also come up with suggestions

for kinds of tasks that could be better done by private industry

contracted to from the government . Hume: That was not the purpose of the task force. The purpose was clearly

laid out, not whether government ought to do this or that, but how

it could be done more efficiently and economically.

II

Morris: You also drafted some of their secretaries too, I understand. Hume: I cannot tell you, I do not remember that. That might very well

have been done but that would have been handled by the man we got to

head the task force program. Morris : The man from Price Waterhouse? Hume: Yes. I believe that he was the retired head of Price Waterhouse.

35

IV OBSERVING REAGAN AS GOVERNOR; PRESIDENTIAL POTENTIAL

Serving as Chief of Protocol

Morris: I would like to ask a couple of questions about your protocol responsibilities .

Hume: I can answer those pretty quickly.

Morris: Were the protocol responsibilities something that took up a great deal of your time?

Hume: No, it consisted almost entirely of meeting at the airport

dignitaries when they came to the state and attending various consular functions. There was almost no other responsibility that I was asked to perform. Fortunately, I was able to find some able people who enjoyed this kind of social contact who were prepared to serve as deputy chiefs of protocol.

Morris: Yes, I would think it is a special kind of thing.

Hume: I turned over almost all my responsibility to the deputy chiefs. As soon as it was obvious that one of them could handle the job well, I resigned in his favor.

36

Morris: Looking through some of the materials in the Reagan papers in the Hoover, there seems to have been quite a number of people from countries all over the world. I wondered if this was seen at all as a kind of an exposure to foreign relations for Mr. Reagan, that these were good contacts in case he decided to run for the presidency.

Hume: [pause] Perhaps, perhaps. We were most interested when Ron was asked to go to the Philippines to represent Nixon, I think. The Philippine ambassador cabled back to the State Department that Governor Reagan had done more to help Philippine-American relations in the two or three days he was there than anyone had over all the period he knew about. The excellent reception he had in England when he went there to address, I believe, the Pilgrim Association, gave him a good exposure in England.

Morris: The public affairs magazines and the national newspapers, as soon as Mr. Reagan took office, started commenting on him as a potential presidential candidate, along with George Romney and Nelson Rockefeller, who were also active governors at that point. At what point did the group here in California begin to think about him as a presidential possibility?

Hume: I think it was not very long after he took office. He had handled his campaign so well and all of us were so pleased with the way he started handling his job as governor. The steps he was taking were exactly those which we thought ought to be taken. We felt that the same steps should be taken at the federal level. We believed Governor Reagan had more ability to take these steps at

37

Hume: the federal level than anyone else in the country. As a result, very soon the question came up in our discussions: Should we not try to get Reagan to run for the presidency.

We talked about this within, I suppose, a few months after he had gotten into office, certainly less than a year. President Reagan is a very impressive person. Anyone who knows him well realizes how fortunate the public is to have him as a public servant.

Staying in Touch With the Governor's Office

Morris: Was there anyone in paricular on the staff in Sacramento that you could stay in touch with and feed in information that you felt was helpful or that would keep tabs on some of these national issues?

Hume: I think we dealt with his executive secretary. Originally this was Bill Clark and later it was Ed Meese. We also knew well the others who were in his cabinet, including Ike Livermore, Gordon Luce, and the others. We, of course, knew Mike Deaver and the governor's secretaries, so had a series of people to whom we could talk.

We were in and out of Sacramento fairly often. Of course we had had something to do with choosing these people and knew some of them before they took office. They knew that we wanted nothing except to have a better state government.

Morris: And bring things to the Governor's attention that he might not — ?

Hume: I have always made it a policy to see Reagan as seldom as I could and when I did have everything about which I wanted to talk to him

38

Hume: outlined. I wanted to make sure I would not waste his time. I

have always tried to get through my list as quickly as I could.

Ron is excellent in such a discussion. He understands problems

immediately, and you can cover a great deal with him in a short

time. Morris: In your own business, do you use this idea of boiling everything

down to a one-page memo on a subject to get a lot of things tended

to? Hume: No, I do not run my business nearly as efficiently as Ron runs his

office. Morris: You were asking him to do in state government things that did not

get done in business? Hume: Yes, yes. I would be delighted if he were running my business. He

would do it very well. Morris: On the protocol matters, Michael Deaver seems to have had some

concerns that things were not going as smoothly as he thought. Was

this real or did Mike—?

Hume: You mean in the handling protocol? Morris: Right, that things were getting fouled up and that people were not

getting the information that they should have on some of these

things .

Hume: I don't know. Morris: I wondered if this was the way he operates, if he is concerned that

all the details be just right or — ? Hume: Ron functioned by turning a matter over to someone and expecting

him to take care of the matter properly. I do not think he tries to

39

Hume: tell people how to handle the details of what they are doing. I

think probably Mike is more interested in details, and someone has to watch the details. Morris: He likes to see things run smoothly. You know, some people can

live quite comfortably with details not getting handled and other people find the details very important.

Republican Party Matters

Morris: It was in 1969, I think, that Mr. Reagan asked you to serve on the

Republican State Central Committee?

Hume: I guess so, yes. I didn't do very much on it. Morris: Because there was not much to do or — ?

Hume: I am just not enthusiastic about taking part in organizations like the state central committee. There is so much overhead structure and there are so many people involved, you spend too much time talking. I prefer not to spend my time in a big group meeting. I would rather try to do on my own something I felt was important. Morris: The party did not seem to be a terribly central activity? Hume: I have never been particularly happy with the philosophy of the

party. I think the party has been to a considerable extent controlled by people whose political philosophy was not the same as mine. Morris: So it has been that the people who were in the leadership roles,

rather than the party itself? Hume: I should think so.

40

Morris: Did groups within the party cause some difficulty in the 1968

campaign? There were some comments that there were those who were not happy with a favorite son delegation to Miami in 1968?

Hume: I am sure that is so. You had people who felt that the heads of the party organization should control the delegation rather than the governor. The party had had very little to do with the election of Reagan. The organization of the precinct work and of the fund- raising and of the campaign had been in the hands of others. The party was there to some extent, but you just do not seem to get the drive with a big, amorphous party organization that is necessary to wage an effective campaign.

Morris: In 1968 you had Mr. Nixon also very actively seeking the presidency. Would the party organization be a place where you would get some struggle between Nixon supporters and Reagan supporters?

Hume: I suppose so. California has a unit rule for their delegation. We saw no reason that this should not be observed.

Morris: In aid of the candidacy that you personally were — ?

Hume: In other words, Governor Reagan was the choice of the people of the state to be the leader of the party and not the state chairman of the Republican party. Everyone who is a delegate is obligated to support the favorite son until he releases them, and we were not enthusiastic when some people said that they did not want to abide by this unit rule.

41

Morris: That was an interesting situation, because you had two major figures seeking the national top spot, both of whem were Californians. Did that complicate it any that — ?

Hume: Sure, sure. Of course one had a strong national organization, the other did not.

Morris: There seemed to be a kind of a loose national information and fund- raising group in aid of Republican candidates. I understand that Mr. Reagan had some contacts with that. As early as 1968, they were asking him to do speeches to Republican groups around the country.

Hume: He has always been the most effective fundraiser that the Republican party has. He has always been very generous with his time fundraising in different locations over the country.

Morris: More effective at that point than Mr. Nixon?

Hume: Much more so, yes. I perhaps should not make that as a flat statement. I should say, I would assume so.

Morris: Did you get involved in some of those speaking engagements around the country?

Hume: I would say not, no.

Morris: When Mr. Nixon was elected president was there much contact back and forth between the state people working with the governor and people in Washington working with the president?

Hume: [pause] Some. I think that, in my opinion, Nixon was frightened by the strength Ron had shown in Miami. Ron came very close to being nominated. If one individual had not made a commitment to Nixon and had done what I think he wished to do, we might very well have gotten the nomination.

42

Morris :

Hume:

Morris: In 1968?

Hume: In 1968.

Morris: Was that a Calif ornian?

Hume: No, it was Strom Thurmond. He had made a commitment to Nixon, but he was basically a supporter of Ron, because Ron is more conserva tive than Nixon is.

What was the effect of Mr. Nixon being concerned about the strength that Mr. Reagan had shown?

Well, there was not much enthusiasm for Reagan people in the Nixon administration, in spite of the fact that Reagan's efforts had been very instrumental in the Nixon election.

Morris: Once Reagan lost the nomination he was willing to — ?

Hume: He then completely turned over his organization to help Nixon.

This is typical of the way Ron handled losing the nomination. He did the same thing when he lost to [Gerald] Ford in 1976. That is one of the great things Mike Curb did. He led the volunteers who had worked for Reagan before the 1976 convention — the whole volunteer organization which was so effective and which, as I told you, was outside of the Republican party. Mike led them almost kicking and screaming to support Ford. Thanks largely to Mike Curb they gave strong support to Ford, and Ford won in California. I question whether he would have without this volunteer support.

43

Morris: Several people, most notably Mr. Reagan's Lieutenant Governor

[Robert Finch], went to Washington with Mr. Nixon. Was there some feeling the other way around, that some — ?

Hume: He took some of the good people from Sacramento, because they were the best people he could get at in the country. Ron was very help ful in releasing people to go to Washington.

Morris: Was there some feeling of concern among Mr. Reagan's people that some of these folks, like Mr. Finch and Hugh Flournoy, were too close to Mr. Nixon, and therefore might not be totally loyal to the things that Mr. Reagan was trying to accomplish?

Hume: I think that both Finch and Flournoy were not philosophically

attuned to Reagan. Finch is not a conservative, and he is also not very efficient, in my opinion. He was not a very satisfactory lieutenant governor. Ron tried to give him responsibilities, and things simply did not get done. He tried very hard to put things into the Lieutenant Governor's area of responsibility.

Morris: Was this one of the ideas that was developed by the advisory group, that the Lieutenant Governor could take on more responsibility?

Hume: I do not believe that it was developed by the advisory group, but it was a philosophy of Ron's. He is doing the same thing now assigning responsibilities to George Bush. He has tried to build up Bush in every way he can, making him an executive vice-president. That is typical of him.

44

Morris: That makes sense from a corporate point of view, to delegate things

to an administrative officer. Hume : Yes . Morris: In politics I thought it was frowned upon, because you are dividing

your strength and your loyalties by turning over responsibilities

to others. Hume: Ron does not worry about the political implications of most things.

He is really above that. He does what he believes will accomplish

the job best.

Ideas From the General Electric Years

Morris: Did you ever talk to him about where some of these ideas developed in his own experience, and how he came to have a feel for running a large governmental office?

Hume: I think the experience he had working for General Electric was very important for him. He was employed by General Electric when its labor force was among the most radically dominated labor forces in the industry. For years he traveled around the country to the 130 plants of General Electric. He would go down the production line talking to small groups, sometimes as many as fifteen or twenty different groups in a day, I understand.

After his talk he asked for questions. These covered the relationship of the corporation to its employees. One of the points he emphasized was that the only way wages could be increased was for the corporation to be successful. He explained how the private

45

Hume: enterprise system works, how it is to the advantage of the worker

to make good products so that they will sell well. This is the only way a company earns the money to pay higher wages.

In that period, Reagan honed his ideas and his philosophy to a point where now he does not have to work out the answer to most questions when they are presented to him. The question just fits into a slot in his philosophy so the answer is obvious to him. This makes it easier for him to answer questions because he has already thought so many problems through to a logical conclusion. He is also so clear in his thinking, which, of course —

Morris: Did he get a lot of challenges from some of the GE employees?

Hume: I gather a tremendous number. At first he had to face a lot of

heckling. I gather that over a period of time he did such a great job that it changed the whole attitude of the work force. I am sure that he did not do this alone, but I am told that he played an important part in creating a much better atmosphere in General Electric. I know one of his greatest supporters is a man named Samuel R. Boulware, who was in charge of employee relations at General Electric. He is the man who hired Ron. He could not say enough nice things about Ronald Reagan.

Morris: Did you ever have a chance to talk to Mr. Boulware?

Hume : I talked to him I think on the phone once or twice and I imagine I have met him. I do not, however, know him at all well.

Morris: I was wondering if GE had developed this kind of approach in order to deal with a pressing labor relations problem?

46

Hume: Yes. Their approach of cooperation rather than confrontation with employees was so effective that the labor union officials called it "Boulwarism". The heads of the union said it was unfair to unions. They maintained that the relationship between a company and its employees must be through the union and not direct. Obviously, the union felt it could not prosper in an atmosphere of cooperation between employer and employees.

Morris: It has rung an echo in my mind of what was done in World War II. This was part of the wartime productivity program for which they used to give the army-navy "E" .

Hume: I know. Our company received the army-navy "E" three different times .

Morris: Are there any things about working with Mr. Reagan in Sacramento or on the campaign trail that I have not pried out of your very good memory?

Hume: Well, I am sure that I have emphasized to you several times that

our country is fortunate to have such an able individual as president. One of his greatest assets is a very retentive mind.

Another is his excellent judgment. For example, on several occasions a group of his friends has brought a program to him that we thought he ought to adopt. Often Ron has thought over the program and then said, "Well, thank you very much, but I do not believe I will follow your advice." Almost always, subsequent events have proved his judgment was better than that of his advisors.

47

Hume: President Reagan is very much his own man. He makes his own

decisions. When he was first elected governor, people wanted to know the name of his speech writer because early on no one could believe that he wrote his own speeches. But he did write them. And there was no speech writer. Of course, he had individuals who did research on particular problems for him, and he used the infor mation they developed in his speeches.

People also wanted to know who his gag man was. Again, he did not have a gag man. With his wonderful memory and his great sense of timing, he is probably the finest story teller that I know and always seems able to tell one that is very appropriate.

Morris: He has had a lot of experience over the years.

Hume: Of course, he has had a lot of experience. But he has benefitted from it.

Morris: On the broader scale, was the thought that if you got together a group that could elect such an effective spokesman, this would eventually bring around a larger section of public opinion to the ideas that you were interested in?

Hume: Yes, we all hoped that we could accomplish something for our country. On the other hand, many years ago I personally came to the conclusion that my efforts in politics were fighting battles and that even when we won them we were losing the war. I decided that we were going to continue to lose the war until we developed a body politic that was more knowledgeable about basic economics. Hopefully, such an electorate will appreciate the implications of political proposals and reject those which are economically unsound.

48

Hume: An example of winning a great political victory and still continuing to lose the war has occurred recently in California. Reagan, when he was governor, did a great deal to improve the fiscal condition of our state and improve the quality of the people in state government. He put excellent people on commissions, appointed fine individuals to the state courts and improved the integrity of state government.

Now almost all these good things have been destroyed by his successor. Morris: Is that perhaps indicative of the fact that there is a constant

ebb and flow of ideas in the public consciousness? Hume: I think it is because an individual who is primarily politically

motivated can confuse the public and trick it into making them think that public programs are free. Jerry Brown is — Well, it is difficult for me to talk about him. I feel very upset with what he has done to the state, because Ron had started it on a fine path, in my opinion.

Morris: How much effect do overall general economic conditions (over which presumably one state cannot have an effect) have a bearing on what happens to a state financially and administratively?

Hume: I do not think that general economic conditions have much to do with the problems in Sacramento we are facing now. The decision that the state surplus was a bottomless well which could be used to bail out all local activities after the passage of Proposition 13 is the principal cause of our fiscal problem. If taxes had been cut instead of building up that surplus, it would have been much better.

49

Morris: That was an issue that Mr. Reagan had to deal with, too, I under stand.

Hume: Yes. I wish that Reagan had cut taxes more before he left. I think it's too bad that he left a tax program which would produce such a surplus. It encouraged politicians to continue to fund programs that Proposition 13 said by implication the public wanted curtailed.

Transcriber: Ilanna Yuditsky Final Typist: Joan Cardellino

50

TAPE GUIDE — Jaquelin Hume

Date of Interview: January 26, 1982 tape 1, side A tape 1, side B tape 2, side A tape 2, side B not recorded

1

17 34

INDEX — Jaquelin Hume

51

agriculture

vegetable dehydrating, 1-3, 32 AMPCO Foods, Inc., 3 appointments, to office,

gubernatorial, 16, 25, 32 1966-67 transition, committee on, 26-27, 29, 37

Basic Vegetable Products Co., 2, 46 Boulvare, Samuel R., 45-46 Brown, Edmund G., Jr. (Jerry), 48 Bush, George, 43

business, and government, 10, 13, 26, 30-34, 38, 44

California Republican Assembly, 19-

20 campaign finance, 6-8, 12-14, 17-

18, 25, 41

campaign management, 19, 42 Chickering, Sherman, 15 Christopher, George

1966 primary campaign, 22-23 Citizens for Eisenhower, 4, 5,

9-10

communism, ant i- communism, 4 conservatives, 10, 13, 15, 25, 26,

28, 42, 43

Cravens, Malcolm, 15 Curb, Mike, 42

Deaver, Michael K., 37-39 Democratic party, Democrats, 27 Douglas, Helen Gahagan, 4

Eisenhower, Dwight D.

1952 campaign, 4, 8-10 elections, 1950, 4 elections, 1952, 4, 8-10 elections, 1954, 5-6 elections, 1964, 7-8, 11, 14

elections, 1966, 14-18, 20-25 elections, 1968, 40-43 elections, 1976, 42-43

federal government

spending, 10, 16, 28, 32

programs, 11

regulation, 11 Finch, Robert H., 43 Flournoy, Houston (Hugh), 43

General Electric Co., 44-46 Goldwater, Barry, Sr.

1964 presidential campaign, 7-8,

11, 14, 17 governor, office of (Ronald Reagan)

protocol, 35-36

Hume, William, 2, 32

Johnson, Gardiner, 15, 20

Kaiser, Leland, 15, 20 King, Warren, 30n Knowland, William F., 9-10

labor, and politics, 13 labor, and management, 44-46 legislature, California, 27-28 liberals, 13, 15, 24 lieutenant governor, office of, 43- 44

Madison, Mrs. Marshall, 15

Nixon, Richard, 4, 7, 9-10, 36 1968 campaign, 40-43 as president, 41, 43

52

Pacific Telephone Co., 32, 34 Parkinson, Gaylord B., 23-24

Reagan, Ronald, 38-39

and foreign relations, 36

and General Electric Co, 44-46

as governor, 27, 30, 32, 36, 43,

47-50 philosophy of government, 15-16,

44-45

as president, 44, 47 as presidential candidate, 36-37,

40-43 steering committee, 20, 24, 25-

27, 36-37, 47 transition into governor's office,

25, 29

1966 campaign, 14, 15, 17, 20-24 Republican party, Republicans,

California

California Plan, 5, 28 in San Francisco, 7 and 1966 campaign, 24 State Central Committee, 39-40 Republican party, Republicans,

national

1954 congressional campaign, 6 1968 presidential campaign, 40-41 1976 presidential campaign, 42-43 Rockefeller, Nelson

1964 presidential campaign, 8 Rubel, A. C. (Cy), 14

Task Force on Government Efficiency and Economy, 1966-67, 30-35

Thurmond, Strom, 42

transition, 1966-1967, 25-27, 29, 37

Tuttle, Holmes, 12, 14

voluntary organizations, volunteers, 19, 42

Warren, Earl

1952 presidential campaign, 9 Weinberger, Caspar, 15, 24

Salvatori, Henry, 12, 14 San Francisco, California

Republican County Central Committee, 7

labor unions in, 13 socialist party, socialists, 3, 11 state government

departmental reports, 20-21

improvement of, 31

spending, 16, 48-50

staffing, 29-30

task forces, 20, 30 Steel, Robert, 7

Regional Oral History Office University of California

The Bancroft Library Berkeley, California

Government History Documentation Project Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era

Eleanor Ring Storrs

PARTIES, POLITICS, AND PRINCIPLES; "IT'S AT THE LOCAL LEVEL"

An Interview Conducted by Sarah Sharp 1983

Copyright ( 1984 by the Regents of the University of California

Eleanor Ring Storrs with Governor Ronald Reagan, ca. 1972

TABLE OF CONTENTS — Eleanor Ring Storrs

I BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 1

Citizens for Constructive Action 1

Genealogy; California and San Diego Past 3 Getting Into Political Activity: Opposition to the Coronado Bridge 7

II POLITICS OVER THE YEARS 10

The Republican Party in San Diego and Statewide Issues 10 The Goldwater Candidacy and the Republican National Convention, 1964;

General Notes on Political Conventions 17

Republican National Committeewoman, 1968-1972 22

Additional Reminiscences: The Local Level, Ronald Reagan Then and

Now 29

Republican Campaigning, Mr. Reagan, and Party Principles 31

Applause for Volunteers 35

The Republican Party, the Long View 37

TAPE GUIDE 40

INDEX 41

Coronado Journal, May 24, 1979, p. 9

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BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

10 August 1981

Subject: Storrs ,

Keith Jr.,U.S.N

Education

Public

Religion : Patriotic

Home

Eleinor (Renolds ) (Ring) , born Tunkhmnock, Pennsylvinii .Formerly mirried Sin Diego Cilifornii 10 Sept 1932 to the late Vice Admir- 1,1 Stanhope Cotton Ring U.S.N., Rtd. (Deceised 1963). Remirried 3 July 1976 Reir Adminl A.Putmm Storrs, U.S.N. Rtd. Children :

Stewirt Andrew Ring,

William Reynolds Ring, deceised, Lieut. U.S.N. Susin Ring, wife of Ciptiin Robert Tiylor Scott Grindmother of five.

Diughter of Piy Director Zibi Wells Reynolds, U.S.N. and Belle Stewirt Reynolds, and grind-diughter of The Hon. Williim Nicholas Reynolds, Member of the Pennsylvinii House of Representiti ves , liter Director of Pension Bureiu Middle Atlantic States it Wish- ington D.C. Mrs. Storr's miternil gnndpirents were pioneers of Sin Diego County. Mr. Williim Willice Steiuirt cime to Plicer County , Calif ornii in 1852 md mirried it Sicnmento in 1859 Miss Ellen Isibell^ Rym. They estiblished residence in San Diego in 1869 where Mr. Stewirt, i wholesile merchmt, wis ictive in pub lic affairs, serving five yeirs on the Sin Diego City Council md later as i member of the Boird of Educition md the San Diego Hirbor Commission.

Griduite of Coronado High School; ittended University of Calif ornia it Berkeley, and schools in Europe. Af fiirs:

President ( former) Coronado Republicin Womens Club , Federated ; former President San Diego County Federition of Republican Women; former Boird Member, Southern Division, Cilifornii Stite Federited Republicin Womens Clubs; former member CFRW Stite md Southern Division Boirds; former Vice Chairmin Republican State Centril Committee South; Alternate Delegite for Nixon 1960, 1968; Dele gate for Nixon 1972; Delegite for Ronald Reigin 1976; Alternate Delegate for Goldwiter 1964; Member of Election Cimpiign Committee for Governor Ronald Reagan, Congressman Bob Wilson, State Senator Jick Schride, md State Assemblymin E. Richard Barnes; Nationil Committeewoman for Cilifornii 1968-1972; Red Cross Grey Lidy; Red Cross Motor Service; former member Coronido City Council; Volunteer Red Cross First Aid Instructor now spins over 30 years. Many others.

Episcopal Affiliations:

Member Oliver Wetherbee Chapter (Coronado) DAR; Member National Society, Colonial Dames of America; Member Society of Sponsors of The United States N^vy. Address

801 Toliti Avenue, Coronido, Californj.i 92118. Telephone listed.

I BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

Citizens for Constructive Action

[Date of Interview: February 15, 1983]##

Storrs: Remember, he [Ronald Reagan] was [in] political science when he was in college, which sometimes people forget. So he was always interested in government. We [Citizens for Constructive Action] started having these meetings — one was up in San Francisco. We would always meet at the airport, so it would be convenient for people. I remember, a great deal of the time we interviewed people who said, "I want to be governor," or who wanted to run for governor. Everybody from a distinguished retired general of the army to, oh, some perfectly interesting, fascinating people. Once they would get the questions from this group on the things, they'd say, "Huh? I didn't know that it was such and so. Well, no, I think I don't want to run."

Sharp: How many people did you end up interviewing?

Storrs: Oh, Lord, Frank Adams would have really all of the notes and things on it. But at this one meeting, we're doing the California platform you might say. It was in San Francisco and we got in the biggest row you've ever known, the north against the south — this has always been, the north against the south: "We're going to do it this way." "No, we're going to do it this way." "I won't." Well, this went on for about two hours and we had gone through no agreement on about five, six, or seven things for the platform. The president [Ronald Reagan] was sitting back and he got up. (I

##This symbol indicates that a tape or a segment of a tape has begun or ended. For a guide to the tapes see page 40.

suppose there were sixty people in the room or something like that.) He said, "Bill, can I have the floor for a few minutes?"

Sharp: Now, who is Bill?

Storrs: [William F.] Knowland. He said, "Sure, come on up." So he goes on up and he said, "Now, look" (he didn't have a note), he said, "Look, you guys are talking about this. You want that. Now, couldn't we take that and do it this way? Wouldn't that be agreeable to both sides? Wouldn't that be what you are both talking about?"

"Yes, yes, okay."

Of course, he was there for about an hour. He went through every single one of these different planks giving both sides each time and saying, "But the solution, the proper thing to do would be so and so." When he finished, everybody in the room got up and cheered and started looking at each other. "Aha, Aha," and that's when people were saying, "He ought to run for governor."

Sharp: Why could he do that?

Storrs: Because he is a brilliant man and people don't realize it. He is one of these guys that gets up in the crack of dawn and does his study work and so forth. He has a very brilliant mind which people don't realize.

Anyway, after that a number of us said, "He is going to have run for governor. So it was a thing of saying, "Would you consider running for governor?" He would say, "Of course, not! In the first place, Nancy [Mrs. Reagan] would never stand for it. She doesn't like that sort of thing and it wouldn't be good for the children and besides I'm scared to fly!" (He used to drive all of the time.)

So five months later he had come down here to a meeting in San Diego. There were about fifteen hundred women there and he was speaking on government and so forth and so on. That whole group just went absolutely — you know. Afterwards, he had interviews with people in San Diego County all afternoon. At one stage we had been talking about it. [I said], "When did you get into this? With the San Francisco meeting like a lot of other people did, too? We realized that you had the capabilities, you knew the state well, you had been an organizer, you had headed up your [Screen Actors] Guild thing and kept peace in there (which certainly was a very complicated thing and a very complicated organization), and we just felt there was no question that you were the best qualified. When did you make up your mind that you had to do it, that it was an obligation and something that was necessary for this state?"

2a

Which of these possible candidates would YOU like to see become the Republican nominee for Governor of California in 1966.

Thomas H. Kuchel

George Christopher

Goodwin Knight

Bob Monaghan

Max Raf f erty

Ronald Reagan

Joe Shell

Comments

This short questionnaire is from Mrs. Storrs's collection of California political materials.

At one stage he said, "I thought this over very seriously after I interviewed in San Diego and everything when I was driving home to Pacific Palisades. I sat down and talked the whole thing over with Nancy" — because he always has done this sort of thing. He very often would be in something and he would say, "Hm, let me go home and kick this around with Nancy. I would like to see what she thinks about it." He has always been this way, very quietly, no big fanfare kind of thing. But, of course, she is a very brilliant woman. She went to Chicago Girls Latin School, that was her background. I had never known she had gone to the Chicago Girls Latin School, which I had gone to one year. %~*;-

Sharp: Oh, is that right?

Storrs

H

:.vivYes. This was at some meeting up in Los Angeles and she had to speak. This was later and, oh, boy, she was scared, of course. At one stage they asked her, "Where did you go to school?" So she told them Chicago Girls Latin School and so forth and so on. Afterwards, when we left, we were in the girls' room before she was going home and I said, "Lord, I didn't know you went to Chicago Girls because I was there one year." She turned to me and she said, "Do you know it is no longer Chicago Girls Latin School?" I said, "What do you mean?" She said, "They have combined Boys and Girls Latin Schools. It is the Latin School now." I said, "Oh, horrors!" She said, "I agree with you!" Because when it was a girls' school, the athletics thing was one of ;the bi& things. Well, the minute you get the boys' and the girls' school together —

Sharp: That ' s it ! This was a high school now?

Storrs: Yes, a high school, a private school in Chicago right there off of Lakeshore Drive. Do you know where the Drake Hotel is? It was just up Porter Street.

[laughs] Oh, Lord! But I had been there years before she was, but I went to a different school every year of my school life.

Genealogy; California and San Diego Past

Sharp: Were you a navy family then?

Storrs: Yes.

Sharp: There was a lot of moving around and all of that?

Storrs: Yes, always into the moving. Then my mother was a Calif ornian, my father was a Pennsylvanian. My Grandfather Stewart came across the plains [with] oxen and team. Grandmother Stewart, oh, her mother, they were French-Irish from the Lake Champlain area. Her sister married a medical doctor and he wanted to come to California. This was in the fifties. Her mother said, "I would not allow a daughter of mine to go out there alone. Her sister will go with her." And that's how my grandmother [came], [laughs] They went by boat down to Panama, by burro across Panama — by burro across Panama! — and then by ship up to San Francisco. Then she met Grandpa in Sacramento. They were married in Sacramento at the sheriff's home. He was then a miner, of course, in Placerville — Hangtown. But he was the deputy sheriff I think basically because he was six feet tall and a good guy. That was an honorary job at that stage. They had the volunteer fire departments, of which he was also a member.

My mother was born in Hangtown before it was Placerville. That's when they moved to San Diego because Grandpa said, "This is no place to raise children" — and at that stage there were four — "and we are going to move. Anyway, I am going into the wholesale shipping business," which he did.

He worked his way across. We came with the free enterprise system all right. His father didn't want him to come to California. They were from Bellefont, Pennsylvania. They were the Stewarts that had fled the Bonny Prince Charlie thing. I don't know, if they hadn't fled, they would have all been hung or something. They came originally to New Hampshire and then they got the land grant from William Penn and moved down to Bellefont.

His father, John Stewart, did not want him to go to California. But a friend of his father's said, "Yes, I agree with you." So he only got as far as Louisville, Kentucky, He didn't have any money. So he didn't come out in [18] '49. He didn't come out until '51. But he was smart enough, he was working in a warehouse, to make enough money to come. He went to Commercial College in Louisville, Kentucky and, by God, if I didn't find (I've got it right here) his certificate at the Louisville Commercial College. He graduated in June of '51 and then came out that summer to California. They were all wagon train.

Probably in Arizona they were attacked by probably Apache, all left for dead. But he and this other guy were not dead. They got themselves together. Six of the oxen were there and so they got a wagon and the six oxen, and they made their way up and ended up in — where is it? I was going to say Death Valley, but it isn't; up in northern California up near Hangtown. Spring Valley. They ended up there, sold the oxen for $100 each, which was a tremendous amount of money. So they each had a $300 stake to start out with.

Sharp:

Storrs :

Sharp: Storrs:

Sharp: Storrs:

Sharp : Storrs:

Sharp: Storrs:

That's a lot of money.

You bet it was. [laughs] But they did things. That's part of the thing. I was raised to go and do things that need to be done for a community or a [cause] — that's how I got all mixed up in this stuff.

So you have brothers and sisters?

My brother was Capt. Stewart Shirley Reynolds, USN Retired, and he has passed away. My sister is Ruth Reynolds Murray (Mrs. Paul) here in Coronado. She was musical. There was a great deal of music in the family. She was the first soloist with the Los Angeles Philharmonic. Then she married and she has been widowed many years. She is not well at all. She has to have nurses around the clock with her. I'm the baby in the family.

Did your sister get involved in some of the Republican activities?

No, because she was only involved in all of the musical stuff; that is, she would go east later on picking the Metropolitan Opera people from the people out here in California. You know how they have that musical stuff and they interview people and everything at that time. Then she usually would go east to New York where they would have the finals for who was going to be picked to be able to go into the Metropolitan and those kind of things.

Did your parents live to see you involved in some of the political work?

My father died when I was eleven years old. was twenty-four.

Were you already married by that time?

My mother died when I

Yes, I had been married and divorced. I was married the first time when I was twenty — really against the family's wishes. Mother said, "He's too old." He was ten years older than I was. He was a naval aviator, Mort Seligman and of the Seligman faily of Sante Fe, New Mexico. I might tell you that his mother, father, and I and his uncle, Uncle Pete [Seligman], who became governor of New Mexico, remained absolutely close friends. When I came back here to get a divorce — because he got to drinking, he always had — his uncle, who was governor of New Mexico, came out to see me. I said, "Uncle Pete, are you mad at me?" He said, "No, I totally agree with you. Why is he drinking the way he is as my son is? What happened with us that we have two sons that are basically alcoholic?" I said, "Uncle Pete, I don't know." And I have never known whether it was because their mothers were Protestants and the background was Jewish and they felt something or other in here.

Uncle Pete said, "Look, I am governor of the state of New Mexico. You are going to come and stay with Aunt Frank and me and I will give you any job in the state." I said, "Uncle Pete, "I couldn't." [laughs]

Then my mother decided [I should stay with her after the divorce] — remember when you used to have an interlocutory decree and so forth? So mother hadn't been very well and she had this great friend of hers, Grace [Timkin Burt], they were raised together in San Diego. She married Will Timkin of Timkin roller bearings and that sort of thing — enormously wealthy — and she and my mother had grown up together. When she died, she left mother $10,000. We had no money. My mother had a pension of $50 a month and my brother, an ensign, sent her $100 a month and that's what we had to live on. People say, "Oh, gee, of course you were raised — ."

My poor mother never learned how to cook because when she was young in San Diego in the old house, Mother said the table was never set for less than twenty because everybody could always bring friends home; a Chinese cook, and Chinese vegetable boys — they used to call them, and nobody could go near the kitchen. If anybody would go into the kichen the cook said , "Get out of my kitchen." So none of them ever learned to cook or anything like that. Of course, remember this was the boom and bust days in San Diego. Whenever they had good rains, there would be dandy crops and every body — gee, it was great, and then they'd have a drought. Ha! And everybody went bust you might say.

My grandfather helped Quon Mane get started in business. That is a Chinese name. Quon Mane came — his uncle was the cook — and he came as a vegetable boy in the Stewart household. My grandfather felt he was entirely too smart. When he was about fifteen he took him down to his warehouse and had him learn things. So today I read that it was George Marston who started him in business and, sure, George Marston did help, but it was Grandpa basically. He opened his own little shop, Quon Mane, but was always known in the family as Amen, [laughs]

Many years later we used to have a Quon Mane store here in Coronado. I was going in there to get some wedding presents and things, and I look at this Chinese boy and I say, "What Quon are you?" He said, "I'm King." I said, "What relation are you to Amen?" He looked at me and said, "You called him Amen?" I said, "Yes." He said, "Who are you?" I said, "My grandfather was William Wallace Stewart and my mother was Belle Stewart." He said, "Oh, I'm sorry! One thing we were all told was that at no time [when] any member of the Stewart family ever came for anything would they pay; you may have anything in the shop." I said, "Now, wait, stop it!"

Sharp: Storrs:

He said, "No, no, I have been very firmly instructed." When Amen was dying my Aunt Kate, who was still alive (she was the oldest girl), he called for her and she went up to Mercy Hospital and sat there with him. He said, "Before I die I want to tell you that I have informed my family about what the Stewart family did for us all the way along the line, the two older girls" (that were named for the Stewart family you might say) "what your grandfather did all through the years and none of us can ever, ever repay and I want you to know this, Miss Kate." (It was Miss Kate.) Aunt Kate, ah, she was a mass of ruins, of course, because she adored him. They all were real close.

So I said to this kid, I said, "Look, what you are doing to me, I'll never be able to come into the store again, and I love the things you have. I happen to be very fond of Chinese things and I would be very fond of getting wedding presents that are these sorts of things. Now you are going to stop me. I don't want this to happen and so you are going to have to change or I will never walk in here again." So anyway, he went and got on the phone and talked to somebody. We finally agreed that I could pay for those sort of things, but, my little boys were a year and three years or something and he picked out little treats to go home for the kids. So I said, "All right, I'll accept this!" [laughter] Old time San Diego, you know.

Oh, that is. That goes back a long way.

But this is not politics. This is old — I shouldn't get on with that.

Getting into Political Activity: Opposition to the Coronado Bridge

Sharp :

Storrs:

Sharp:

I am interested to know what you thought about getting into real political activity?

Again, I think it's at the local level. People must pay attention to government where they are and, of course, as I say, I begin with family, mother and the children and the family. Then your local level — pay attention, go to your council meetings, find out what the city is doing, or if you are in another area, go and see what the supervisors are doing on the county level. Pay attention; don't let it all just — "who's doing what?"

You were telling me about the bridge, the Coronado Bridge, and the opposition that you personally had to it, and that you made it a broader operation, as it were.

Storrs: A lot of us felt we wanted to stay to a great extent isolated. We loved the ferry boats that went over. A great many of our businessmen here would walk to the ferry, would go across and walk to their offices or take their bikes and bike, which they enjoyed thoroughly. They didn't have to park their cars, didn't have to get into anything like that. We had loads of children, remember; before we had a Catholic school here, they went over to the Catholic schools in San Diego. They could get on their bikes and no problem, and also young ones going to the business schools over there and things of this nature where they didn't have the money for cars and that [the bridge] cut that all out.

Sharp: Now about when did you start this petition drive? Probably '57? Storrs: Yes, '56 or '57, somewhere in there.

Sharp: Yes, because it was, of course, when Goodie [Goodwin J.] Knight was governor then.

Storrs: Yes.

Sharp: How did you make the leap then from —

Storrs: Because I went and worked for Bob [Robert C.] Wilson for Congress.

Sharp: During his first campaign for Congress?

Storrs: No, no, this must have been '58. It was the first time I had

gotten involved. Then I joined my [Coronado] Republican Women's Club and I became president of that, in 1960 or 1961. I did precinct for the county and then I became county president [San Diego County Federation of Republican Women]. When? Well, it's in there. Doesn't it show? [1962-1963]

Sharp: [looking through papers] Let's see. Maybe it's in one of these articles that you gave me.

Storrs: See, I even save things like this because I admire the president.* [laughs]

Sharp: Oh, that's wonderful. So this is a copy of one of the talks then?

Storrs: Yes, when he was working for General Electric. He came down here and spoke to American Red Cross.

*See following pages.

8a

25

RONALD REAGAN

Host, General Electric Theatre

Losing Freedom by Installments

Today all of us are convinced that the No. 1 problem in the world is the dispute between the free world and Soviet slavery. Here the situation has been highly publicized and yet the American people are confused, dis turbed by a frustrating sense of fail ure, a desire for action but at the same time a concern that action might result in war.

The enemy is not confused. To him the course is very clear — he knows he is in a war now. This conflict was declared more than a century ago by Karl Marx. Half a century later Nicolai Lenin, the interpreter of Marx, made of this phony philosophy a Godless religion, with himself as the Messiah. He reaffirmed that declara tion of war by stating it was incon ceivable that communism and capi talism should exist for a long period side by side in the world, and that ul timately one or the other must con quer. Carefully and painstakingly, but openly, they put into print their plans for our destruction. All of it including the timetable, is available and as near as our public library.

With aiiuganl cynicism they sa> that our ignorance of their tactics and strategy, their aims and objec tives is communism's greatest weapon. In 1923 Lenin announced that communism would take Eastern Europe, organize the hoards of Asia and then surround that last bastion of capitalism, the United States, without even having had to take it. In Lenin's own words, the United States would fall into his outstretched hand like overripe fruit. As we look at the beachhead 90 miles off our Florida coast we know how far they've pro gressed with that plan.

Carefully, with great calculation, the communists gauge their aggres sion — slicing each new gain just thin enough so that we'll say, "That isn't worth fighting for." They predict that when we reach the final slice our surrender will be voluntary because we will have been weakened from within — morally, spiritually, and eco nomically.

They have harnessed the fear of war instead of war itself — knowing that surrender at the conference table can be just as complete as surrender on the battlefield. Indeed, they prob ably have no intention of testing our armed might. They know, even if we don't, that ours is the greatest mili tary power in all the world. You and I, and all free men everywhere, owe our freedom to the determination and dedication of our men in uniform who stand as the only barrier to world slavery.

Mr. Khrushchev has said that capi talism will inevitably evolve into com munism, but not all at once. He says there will first come an intermediate stage of socialism. Supremely confi dent of victory, the communists say we will give up more and more of our democratic practices under the pres sure of the cold war until one day we'll waken to find we have become so much like the enemy that the rea sons for enmity will have disap peared.

Haven't we been trying to fight communists without really fighting communism? There is a liberal phi losophy that seems to think of com munism as simply an extension of extreme liberalism and that Soviet police state brutality is not an integ- . ral part of communism but is rather

an error superimposed on the political system. Those motivated by this so- called liberal philosophy believe the solution !o the cold war is to refrain from any overt act that would anger the men in the Kremlin, while our own system is reshaped into a gov ernment controlled and directed economy. As we move left, the rough necks in the Kremlin, ashamed of their ways, will supposedly come a little right and the conflict will dis solve in one world Utopia.

The liberal campaigns for more and more participation by the fed eral government in areas heretofore the province of the state, community and individual. The only common denominator needed to win their sup port of any legislation is the extent to which it will increase the power and authority of the central govern ment.

It would be immoral and the height of folly to infer these people are less patriotic than ourselves. They are sin cerely motivated by the musl humani tarian of ideals, but it would be equally foolish to let them have their way without opposition. If someone is setting fire to the house, it doesn't matter if he is a deliberate arsonist or just a fool playing with matches, the damage will be the same.

We can lose our freedom all at once by succumbing to Russian aggres sion, or we can lose it gradually by installments — the end result is slav ery. Professor Schlesinger says "The political argument for the welfare state is that the welfare state is the best insurance against revolution." This just isn't true. Our defense against communism is individual free dom and our free economy.

This fight isn't new. In 1917 one of the truly great labor statesmen, Sam uel Gompers, founder of the A. F. L. said, "Compulsory social insurance is in its essence undemocratic and it cannot remove or prevent poverty. The workers of America adhere to voluntary institutions in preference to compulsory systems, which are held to be not only impracticable, but a menace to their rights, welfare and their liberty. Compulsory sickness in surance for workers is based upon the theory that they are unable to look after their own interests and the state must interpose its authority and wis dom and assume the relation of par ent or guardian."

Under high flown phrases "free-

dom from want," "human rights," we see the federal government laying its hand on housing, health, farming, industry and educaion.

An illustration of this is the legis lative battle that has raged over fed eral aid to education. Knowing the normal desire of all of us to provide the utmost for our children, we have been told that an adequate educa tional program is impossible unless we turn to the federal government for subsidy. An emergency situation is described involving crowded class rooms, teachers who are underpaid and too few in number. In the face of this we learn that 99.5 per cent of our school districts have not reached their limit of bonded indebtedness. The construction of classrooms has been increasing at a faster rate than that of student enrollment in the past decade. A 41 per cent increase in stu dent enrollment from 1950 to 1960 has been matched by a 125 per cent increase in spending at the state and local levels over the same period. According to the educationists 60.000 classrooms must be constructed every year for the next 10 years if every child is to have the opportu nity of a full-day education in an adequate classroom. These people seem to have forgotten to mention the fact that we have been building an average of 70.000 classrooms a year for the last five years. A con tinuation of this rate, according to some informed sources, may give us a surplus of classrooms by 1970 and it is more probable that sometime in the i(,»60's school construction will start to decline. Nor do they tell us that it has been estimated that the post war baby boom has been passed and that in the immediate years ahead the increase in the rate of enrollment is expected to decrease.

Teachers have been underpaid, but we are making progress without federal aid. In these first several years the average salary of teach ers has risen from S3 100 to $5200 a year for generally nine months of work. Little evidence has been intro duced which indicates a need exists for federal aid. The professional edu cationists lobby (one of the biggest spenders in Washington) denies fed eral control plays any part in their plans, but in truth, a federal school system is the entire basis for the school aid plan. The foot in the door was the National Defense Education

8b

Act of 1958. Graham Barden, the former chairman of the House Edu cation & Labor Committee, report edly said that the purpose of the cur rent $2.5 billion federal aid bill is to centralize power over the school system here in Washington so that it will be easier to apply concentrated pressure.

Twenty-seven years ago the gov ernment assured the farmer that sub sidy didn't mean control. Then a farmer named Haley discovered he could be fined $4000 for raising wheat on his own land and feeding it to his own cattle. The fine was up held by the Supreme Court with a single sentence ruling that said, in effect, that an agency of the Federal Government has the right to tell a citizen what he can grow on his own land for his own use. Thus the Court practically cancelled out the 4th Amendment to the Constitution — our protection against search and seiz ure. If federal farm agents think a

and it will also pay you to fertilize your land so as to increase the crop yield. Last year the government lost 4.5 million acres of corn land. The government paid $150 million to keep it from being planted, and now it develops that the 4.5 million acres don't even exist, according to Senator John Williams of Delaware.

This "farm mess" involves only l/5th of agriculture — 80 per cent of the farm economy is still out in the free market regulated only by the law of supply and demand. Com mon sense would indicate the answer should be to get that subsidized 20 per cent out into that same free market, indeed responsible farm groups have so advocated. To the bureaucrats the only solution was to bring the other 80 per cent into the government program. Congress was presented with a bill that could have resulted in the licensing of every farm in America, the complete con trol of production and price, and

District Five Vice President Slaughter and Mn S'oughttr, Mr. and Mr* W*b«fer with Ronald Reagan (Center).

farmer is violating a regulation — not a law. mind you, but a regulation of a bureau — they pronounce the farmer guilty and impose a fine without even a formal hearing, let alone a trial by jury. If the fine is not paid, they can seize propert) .

The farm program's reason for hem:; is the control of ovfrprodur- tion. Billions arc spent to store sur plus farm products, and additional billions are spent to reclaim desert land and put it into production. The government will pay you not to plant

artificial shortages to bring about a 15 to 25 per cent raise in the price of foodstuffs. Right now, under the feed grain program, we are told co operation is voluntary, but the Sec retary of Agriculture has the author ity to dump surplus grain on the market to break the price and force non-participants to join.

Medicine is an area dear to the heart of the statist. Government par ticipation can be so easily justified on humanitarian grounds. No one wauls to appear unsympathetic to

8c

those in need of medical care.

Today this country has the costliest government hospital plan in I he world — the Veterans Administration program. No one of us opposes the idea that a man disabled in the serv ice of his country should be given the finest of medical and hospital caie. I'm sure no one protested some years ago when it was suggested that a vet eran not wounded in military service, but who was in need of medical at tention and destitute, should be cared for in a VA hospital if the bed was not required for a patient with a service-connected disability. Today 3 out of 4 VA hospital beds are filled with patients suffering diseases or injuries neither originated by nor aggravated by military service. And each year the budget provides for ex pansion of the VA hospital facilities.

During the 86th Congress, former Congressman Forand introduced a bill, HR 4700, to provide a national program of government health in surance. His bill was overwhelmingly rejected. Now a re-write of that bill, limiting the benefits of citizens of Social Security age, is introduced. Proponents of the measure present an emotional appeal describing the plight of millions of senior ciitzens, ailing and without the means to pro vide adequate care. To oppose this measure is to be accused of throwing our elder citizens out to die. But what are the fad ?

In the last 10 years, 127 million Americans have acquired some form of medical or hospital insurance. Seventy per cent of our people are so protected, including 2/3rds of our senior citizens. At the present rate of increase, it is estimated that 90 per cent of the population will be cov ered by 1970.

As nearly as we can determine, the problem involves less than 10 per cent of the elderly who would not be able to finance needed medical care. To this end, the 86th Congress adopted the Kerr-Mills bill to provide federal funds to the states. Without waiting for this to be put into effect, the advocates of the insurance meas ure claim the only answer to the problem is compulsory government health insurance for all, regardless of need. Never mind if the individual is already insured, has an ample in come or possesses great wealth. Per haps there is a clue lu their (rue purpose in remarks made by now Ex-

Congressman Forand who has said, that if we could only break through and get our foot inside the door, then we could expand the program after that. Like an echo comes a pam phlet from the Socialist party en- 'illed. "The Case for Socialized Medi cine." It says:

"We can do everything possible to encourage federal intervention, the financing of medical costs on a bit by bit basis, and we can work to direct such intervention, so that if it isn't socialized medicine proper, at least it paves the way for socialized medi cine."

It would be well for us to keep in mind that if you socialize the doctor, you can socialize the patient as well.

The flagship of the liberal cause is Social Security. It is offered as the proven vehicle for the medical in surance program. We are told that here is a government insurance pro- giain in which we and our employers pay into a fund so that someday in our non-earning years we will call on this, our own money, to see us through. Of course this isn't what officials of Social Security told the Supreme Court in a recent lawsuit. They said Social Security wasn't actually insurance — but they used that term to sell it to the people. So cial Security dues are a tax for the general use of the government and payment of that tax does not auto matically entitle anyone to the receipt of benefits. The benefits are a welfare program which can be cancelled or curtailed by Congress at any time.

In 1935 that tat was 2 per cent of $3000 of income. Today it is 6 per cent • $4000. If this medical aid bill i , p- •<]. the individual and employ ers' combined contribution will, by 1963, increase from $288 to $444. This is based on a ceiling of $5200 of income, but the Secretary of Health Education and Welfare recently told a congressional committee he fore sees a ceiling of perhaps $9000 on the amount taxed for Social Security. There are others who oppose any ceiling — who say the tax should be levied against total income.

In this insurance program that is not insurance, we who are participat ing are unfunded to an amount more than $300 billion. In a proposal to make Social Security voluntary, Con gressman Rousselot has pointed out that the young man 20 or 21 years of age, starting out at an average sal

ary, must, with his employer, con tribute $1.69 for every dollar he'll receive in benefits.

Turning from domestic welfare to the international scene, we find the same pattern of getting a "foot in the door" then freezing into permanence the temporary expedient. In the days following World War II, Senator Ar thur Vandenburg gave his bi-parti- san blessing to foreign aid with these words, "We are not suddenly re solved to underwrite the earth. That would be fantastic, improvident and impossible. The plan is for 15 months." It is now 15 years, and more than $100 billion later. The original 19 countries to be helped ha\e become 97. Let's ignore the temptation to talk about items such as the road in South Viet Nam which we started to build for $18 million and which isn't finished yet, at $125 million.

AH such things we could swallow if free world strength, solidarity and friendship had resulted. We spent more per capita in Laos than in any other country. Cuba is on the book for $2.5 billion. In these 15 years, communism has, in addition, ab sorbed China, North Viet Nam, and Tibet. Inroads have been made in Indonesia, Iran and Syria. They've tightened their grip on East Ger many, Poland and Hungary. We've financed socialism in India, where the communist party has grown from 4 to 12 million in 5 years. In Bolivia part of our money was used to na tionalize the tin mines, which re duced their output 50 per cent. Thanks in part to Yankee dollars, the cost of living in Bolivia rose over 250 per cent in 1956 alone. Last year the Bolivians staged the worst anti- American riots in South American history. Creating bureaucracy here and in the receiving nations we have in effect exported socialism under the Utopian ideal of world democracy and social revolution.

We talk private enterprise at home, while we finance nationalization of industry all over the world. But that shouldn't surprise us.

In May 1960 during testimony be fore the Senate Small Business Sub committee on Relations of Business with Government, Elmer B. Staats, Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget, said that as of July 31, 1959, the government owned and operated 17,507 businesses. A Subcommittee

8d

on the Hoover Commission found that as of the end of 1954, the De partment of Defense alone was ac tively engaged in activities covering 47 categories ranging from coffee roasting to manufacturing surgical and dental equipment. Operating these businesses in most instances, tax free, rent free, dividend free, in com petition with our own citizens, the government loses billions of dollars each year.

The Depressed Areas bill enacted into law on May 1 has put govern ment's foot in the door of direct con trol of job training and placement, including subsidy and relocation of industries and at the same time has created the biggest potential pork barrel of all time.

We subsidized public housing orig inally so that no one should be forced to live in degradation. Now people of better than average income are declared eligible for such a subsidy and the Chicago Public Housing Au thority announces a plan to add swimming pools, and recreational facilities, including professional di rectors.

These are just a few of the things that have led to the creation of a per manent structure of government so complex it is virtually beyond con gressional control, and certainly is ,elf-perpetuating. Congressman Utt has suggested that we are rapidly coming to a point where a complete change of elected officials, including Congress and the White House, can mean little change in policy. We_ar£. governed more and more by people for whom we have never voted — io'r whom we never will vote, and whom we_ cannot recall by our vote. Even at* Cabinet level, much of die policy is set by Civil Service employees who have been with the department for 20 years. They have no intention now or ever of recommending to the Secre tary any policy which does not fit their personal philosophy of government. This Is a form of invisible govern ment and can lead to the most op pressive type of tyranny.

Two years ago a subcommittee of congress reported there were almost 2.5 million Federal employees. The committee reported it found little evi dence that any bureau, agency or de partment created in answer to an emergency ever went out of existence, even after the emergency disap peared.

Congress abolished the Reconstruc tion Finance Corporation in 1957, but, it has spent over SI million since then. The current budget contains an item of $65,000 for administrative expenses. The Federal Farm Mort gage Corporation formed in Janu ary, 1934, has made no loans since the depression. The authority of the Commissioner expired in 1947 — since 1950, running expenses have amounted to $4 million. Congress ordered the immediate liquidation of the Spruce Products Corporation in 1920. In 1930, they tried again. In 1947, it was still in business. In 1948 they found the answer — they cut off its appropriation. This was the agency created in World War I to find spruce wood for airplane fuse lages.

government, leaving 10 cents for the state, county and local community. It is no wonder we turn to the fed eral government for aid. but wouldn't it make more sense to leave that money in the local community to begin with instead of running it through that puzzle palace on the Potomac, only to have it returned minus a carrying charge?

Early in our history we were warned that the farther the spending was removed from the source of taxa tion, the less restraint there would be in its spending. Today, shocking figures prove the truth of this. When you contribute to your local chari ties, you must give $1.10 for every $1 that is to be spent in good works. County welfare sees an increase in this overhead to where $1.23 must be

At the reception for Ronald Reagan; NECA Executive Vice President Geary, Mr. Reagan, NECA President Webster and Reginald Jones, GE Supply Co.

All of this vast government com plex has been created by a tax sys tem which refuses to recognize any limitations on its right to confiscate the earnings of its citizens.

No nation in its history has sur vived a tax burden that reached a third of the national income. Today the tax collectors take 33 cents out cf every dollar earned and of thai 33 cents, 23 cents goes to the Federal

raised for every $1 actually spent on welfare. At the state level it takes $1.49 and the federal government must raise $2.10 for every dollar it will spend on the recipients of fed eral welfare — a $1.10 overhead for each $1.

To meet this overhead, we are burdened by hundreds of hidden and indirect laves, accoimliiig for 1/3 of our phone hill, 1/4 of the price of

8e

a new car, 1/2 of the gas and oil we use. More than 100 make up half the price of « loaf of bread.

All of these pale into insignificance beside the enormity of the graduated income tax. It too follows the pattern of a modest beginning. It began as a 2 per cent levy and that on only the top incomes. In the lifetime of most of us, this simple 31-word law has grown to more than 440,000 words. It begins at 20 per cent and has its steepest rate of increase through the middle income brackets, where are to be found the bulk of our small businessmen, professional people and skilled craftsmen. At $16.000 a man begins giving the government half of the dollar he can earn and from there it goes up to the confiscatory 91 per cent. There is no moral right in a government taking anywhere from half to 9/10ths of the dollar a man can earn by his own ability. Beyond that is the fact the government can not justify such confiscation on the basis of real need. The government's total grab from all the 50 per cent to 91 per cent brackets is less than 3/-4ths of $1 billion.

Because of our willingness to ac cept the idea that those best able to pay should lighten the burden of those with lesser earnings, we have adopted as proportionate taxati.n this progressive system spav ied b> Karl Marx and declared by hi \ to be the prime essential of a . cialist state — the method prescribed r tax ing the middle class out ol exist ence. For an illustration of the differ ence between proportionate and progressive tax, we can look to the Bible. There tithing is explained as the economic basis of our Judaic- Christian religions. The Lord says you shall contribute one-tenth and He says, "If I prosper you 10 times as much you will give 10 times as much." That is proportionate — but look what happens today when you start computing Caesar's share. A man of average income suddenly prospered 10 times as much would find his personal tax increased 43 times.

If the government confiscated all taxable income above 810,000 a year after exemption and deductions the increased revenue wouldn't pay the interest on the national debt.

Defense is given as justification for the tremendous increase in the

The executive session of Hie convention n called to order.

federal budget and yet since 1953 (the end of the Korean War) defense spending has only increased 1 per cent, while non-defense federal spend ing has increased 63 per cent.

We are told by some congressmen that spending programs are forced on them by pressure groups. Two years ago I was a member of a pressure group. I appeared before the House Ways & Means Commit tee to present the demand of 33

Members listen to the marketing presentation.

unions and the management of the motion picture industry for a tax reform program. In a month of un precedented hearings, every segment of the national economy was repre sented before that committee and every representative demanded lax reform. Eighty-five per cent of those testifying asked the committee to bring forth one particular bill which three years later is still buried in the committee. It would seem pressure

groups are irresistible only if they favor spending.

Several nionllib later they held additional hearings, but this time no volunteers. A group of hand-picked ranipus economists appeared before the committee and spoke only of the government's need for more revenue, not less. Their idea of tax reform involved rate reductions to make it "more palatable," but called for an end fo deducting real estate tax be fore computing income tax. Interest on home mortgages should not be deductible, nor should contributions to educational groups at 100 per cent. Capital gains should be taxed as straight income. Government should use the tax as a police power to determine what constitutes neces sary advertising and expense. Most of the legitimate deductions, without which the programs would have long since been proven unworkable, were called loopholes. A man, now assist ant secular) of the treasury in charge of tax policy, has even explored the possibility of estimating the amount of rent a taxpayer saves by owning his own home and then paying in come tax on that amount.

AH told, these economists were sure their program would get the government $18 billion a year more in revenue, and they just happen to be standing by with $18 billion worth of welfare programs they want the government to adopt.

The big spenders reject the idea that the least government is the best government. According to them, you and I are not smart enough to spend our own money. Government should take it from us through taxation and buy for us the welfare programs we are too stupid to buy for ourselves. Their high ideals cannot excuse the fact that it is dishonest to seek social legislation under the guise of taxa tion. If we are to adopt socialism, then let it be presented to the people as socialism.

Proponents of Keynesian economic theory tell us the national debt is meaningless: It is — it's incompre hensible. Who can understand $298 billion? If I held a stack of $1000 bills in my hand just 4 inches high, I'd have 81 million. If we had the national debt piled up before us in $1000 bills, the pile would be more than 18 miles high. It is a greater amount than all other governments have spent since the beginning of

8f government itself.

Reduction oj and economy in }io\ - eminent is \\hrre we must start. We must demand that congress put an end to deficit spending: that govern ment stay within the limits of its revenue; and that provision be made for regular payments on the national debt. Then we must demand tax re form of the kind that will reduce the percentage of national income con fiscated by the government. We must restore the right of a man to keep the fruit of his toil.

To this end, may I suggest the bi partisan bill still buried in the House Ways & Means Committee — the Her- long-Baker bill (Herlong is a Demo crat, Baker a Republican). This is one of the better prepared tax reform measures to be presented in half a century. Over a five-year period, it gradually reduces corporate and per sonal income tax to a 15 per cent level with a 47 per cent ceiling on surtax.

In the vast permanent structure of government, you and I cannot rec ommend specific areas where savings can be effected — nor can congress, beyond a certain point. However, every businessman knows that if you reduce government income and then issue a blanket order to every depart ment-head and bureau chief that his budget is reduced by that same per centage, he'll know where the useless fat can be trimmed.

Of course there will be screams. It will be said that it is dangerous to reduce taxes before reducing spend ing. They are talking through their hats. Government doesn't tax to get the money it needs — government will always find a need for the money it gets.

We can do this by accepting our responsibility as citizens. In the com ing election year (regardless of party, because this struggle crosses party lines) we must pin down those who solicit our votes as to where they stand on old fashioned economy and tax reform. We must write to our congressmen and senators giving our objection to specific bills where the money cost and the price in individ ual freedom is too high. Write them now and then just to praise them when they are on the right track. Don't belittle this simple procedure. It was just this kind of pressure that stopped (at least for the moment) the school aid bill, headed off the

socialization of our farms, restrained some area? of foreign aid, and so far ha> delayed the medical aid' pro gram. Writing isn't complicated — just put his name on the envelope, then address it "House Office Build ing" or "Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C."

We must do more than just stop spending measures. Containment won't save freedom on the home front any more than it can stop Russian aggression on the world front. We must roll back the network of en croaching controls. We can do it as individuals — we won't need any great new organization.

James Russell Lowell, as Minister to England, was asked how long he thought our Republic would endure. He answered, that our Republic would endure as long as the people keep the ideas of the men who founded it.

And what were those ideas? The founding fathers — that little band of men so advanced beyond their time the world has never seen their like since— created a government based on the theory that you and I have the God-given right and ability to determine our own destiny. Here took place the only revolution in all history that didn't just exchange one set of rules for another. They shaped a government, bound it with a Con stitution, and said its only function was to be a watchdog over man's freedom. They never planned that it should become a cow to be milked.

Here for the first time the in dividual genius of man — every man — was unleashed. Six per cent of the world's population on 7 per cent of the earth's land surface created and owns more than 50 per cent of the world's wealth and that wealth has been distributed more widely among our people than in any other society since time began.

There were no fringe benefits at Valley Forge. The West was won without an area re-development pro gram.

Now you and I must answer once again whether life is so dear and peace so sweet as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery. If we are willing to pledge our lives, our efforts and our sacred honor, then we must one day spend our sunset years telling our children and our children's children what it once was like in America when men were free.

R.onnt.d from QUALIFIED CONTRACTOR. Nov 1961

Sharp: Yes, Mr. [Edgar M.] Gillenwaters was telling me that the first time he heard Ronald Reagan was when he was at Rohr Industries. Mr. Reagan came when he was still with General Electric and just gave this rousing talk. I guess everybody was talking about it for several days afterwards.

Storrs: Now, Burt Raynes, I just saw him the other day, as a matter of fact. They came over, Burt and Lois, his wife, and there is somebody who could give you a lot of insight into things.

Sharp: Yes, yes, that's what we had thought.

10

II POLITICS OVER THE YEARS

The Republican Party in San Diego and Statewide Issues

Sharp: I have some other questions mostly about San Diego because I wanted us to start off at the local level. I have some questions just about the state party operations from San Diego, and so I thought we would start with that and then grow out.

Storrs: We had a chairman [Edwin L. Thacher, GOP county chairman] and he

decided — let me think, this is '60 or '61, I think — that we should have again a committee to interview candidates for assembly, state senate, and Congress in this area.

Sharp: In San Diego.

Storrs: In San Diego County. As a matter of fact, he had Ruth Jackson and I put down who should be on it. Ruth was the San Diego County Federation of Republican Women's Club president or may have been at the time. So what we did was just go straight through the list, took the president of the Republican Women's Club in the county, the presidents of the Young Republicans, the president of CRA [California Republican Assembly], UROC [United Republicans of California], and so forth, and then took in each assembly district. We did about fifty or sixty in each assembly district and then we took outstanding business types in each one of these districts.

Then we met by assembly district. They [the assembly district representatives] elected or nominated or appointed those people that would be on the state senate and assembly interviewing committees and then they picked — and remember, these would overlap — the ones for the congressional recommendations. Then the meetings were held and people interviewed and so forth. I felt that it was one of the healthiest things that had ever happened because that first time we did it with a heavy Democrat voter

11

Sharp: Storrs:

Sharp:

Storrs: Sharp :

Storrs;

registration, we elected four out of our five assemblymen, and we were able to do it because everybody got together.

Now, we had some people that felt, oh, "you're being selec tive," and, "You are being this." We had some people that got really very cross, but then, because it was being followed closely, we had a couple of candidates that would speak in a conservative area and go on a strong conservative [pitch], and go over here, which was a liberal area and do exactly the opposite, and we didn't think that was very good.

Remember, there was some taping in that stage where you could do it so that they would have it. They couldn't say, "I didn't say that." "Uh-huh." So we did and that's when we elected these people and that continued until Les Gehres came in as chairman, Leslie Gehres. He said, "This is the worst thing that ever happened in the county and so forth and so on and we'll not do it, we'll not have this any longer."

It was a time of Arnie [C. Arnholt] Smith basically, you might say, and Gehres worked for Arnholt. So there was a situation set up amongst the real volunteers you might say — Charlie [Charles K.] Fletcher, Gordon Luce, the people that felt very strongly about solid government. There did become a row against each other to a certain extent in there.

ft

This is Les Gehres?

Back in '26 and his wife, oh Lord, I am godmother for their — no, I am not any longer. I was godmother for their daughter until she married a Catholic and then I couldn't be godmother any longer! [laughs] But anyway, so Gehres and I had always been friends but on the county committee we'd battle like grim death. Now, most of the time we'd lose.

I had a couple of questions. In '62 Gaylord Parkinson became the vice-chairman [of the Republican state central committee].

"Parky" — beautiful, beautiful.

That, from what I can tell, is pretty dramatic in the sense of San Diego sort of wrenching control away, at least for that spot, from Los Angeles.

Yes. Parky had remarkable organizational ability and was remarkably conservative. He basically, almost totally alone, you might say, pulled the party together. Parky did it; there is no

12

question about it. Now, I have known him a great many years. His wife was one of my close friends. I knew the boys when they were little and that kind of stuff. He did something that was just perfectly remarkable in this state — and he did it, nobody else. He used to get around and the stuff that he accomplished — let me look here, [refers to papers]

Of course, then Put [Putnam] Livermore [became party chairman in 1969] — there again, we went north, of course. The old Livermore family. When you are an old California family like the Chickerings [laughs] and such like, it always creates a kind of a bond because there weren't too many people at that stage. But Put Livermore was inclined to go with the pressures. Do you know what I mean?

Sharp: Yes.

Storrs: Then, of course, when Gordon [Luce] came in [in 1969] —

Sharp: That was a dramatic difference you would think?

Storrs: Yes, Gordon again did a very remarkable — of course, Gordon was the one that did the Reagan thing, you might say.

Sharp: In what respect?

Storrs: By organization and getting people to realize and as much as any thing else his personality, his being able to get to people. There are some people that can get hold of people and other people — well, Put Livermore always had a certain shyness, shall I say. He was laid back to a certain extent where with Gordon he was always — here I am telling you what I think.

Sharp: Let me ask you a few more questions that may highlight some more of this. I just want us to stay back in time a little bit, but at the point when Parkinson came in as vice-chairman, Caspar Weinberger, of course, was chairman and there seemed to be somewhat of a tension about the party and about the directions the party was supposed to go in. Do you think that?

Storrs: Not too much really. Again, Cap being the northern (the same old bit that we've always gone through to a certain extent) — a little stronger on the — a little more liberal. But I happen to be very fond of Cap. Then you've got to remember that people do change. People will realize that "you mean I advocated that? How did I ever do that?" Do you know what I mean? As they will get more fully informed, get closer into things, they do change. They won't just stick here or maybe they go a little bit more on this or that side.

13

I have always been opposed majorly — I think the women's place is in the home and doing the volunteer work. I don't like to see them in the top industry things. I realize a lot of them are very smart and so forth and that's their life, but they give up a whole part of their life, of their feminine side. They give that all up and even if they have children and they are career women, they haven't the time to spend with their children — you know, "get in my lap" or something when somebody falls down and cries, or they come home from school and Mother's not there, she's at work. I think that's very sad because — of course, I was raised to think [taps for emphasis] you're always home when your children come home from school, period! You don't go out playing bridge or anything. When they come home, any problem that has come up in school, you will hear it immediately. If it's two hours later, they're into something else.

So that again is government at the local level and you follow this through all the way on all levels. Yes, we all change.

Now I see women that are brilliant and doing brilliant things. Some of them had not done it until they were at a certain phase where they felt they could or wanted to, but I don't like women going to the naval acadamy. [laughter] No, I don't! I'm still, you might say, prejudiced. I don't think that's the place for them. I think they're better off when we used to have a separate corps, you might say. Women that started out as yeomen became this, that, and the other thing. They weren't aboard ship ever because that can be distracting. In fact, I had a young captain of a ship and he had some women aboard. I had known him — again, he was a navy family.

I said, "Charlie, how does it do to have women aboard your ship? What happens?" He said, "Oh, don't talk to me!" I said, "Do you mean hanky-panky stuff?" "Oh, no," he said, "I'm not talking about that. One of them picks up something and starts up a ladder and everybody stops working and runs to help her carry it up a ladder, [sighs] It disrupts the whole work on the ship. She is scrubbing at something and gets into or drops something or something, every man in the area stops and runs over to help her! We can't get the work done." [laughter]

Here is my daughter. Now, she works in volunteer things, I am happy to say. [tape interruption]

Sharp: The next question that chronologically fits in here is Mr. Nixon's gubernatorial candidacy which is in '62, in this early period. I wondered if, on this local level, you might have been involved.

Storrs: Well, what was I doing?

14

Sharp: Working with the county committee probably?

Storrs: Probably, oh, yes, by all means I worked for him. He was in the navy. His skipper when he came into the navy lives right here a half a block, Capt. Dorris Gurley [spells name] and they became very close friends. Capt. Gurley very often will — he used to more — reminisce about various and sundry [laughs] times he and Nixon had together when they were all young in the early navy.

I think Mr. Nixon has been very much maligned. I have never heard these tapes where he consents to this or that or the other thing, but I bring it home. I have many a time been on the phone or busy doing something and one of the children would come and say, "Hey, Ma, is it all right if we do so and so and so and so?" And I'd say, "Oh, sure, sure, and I haven't heard a word they said." I think we all do that.

I can't help but feel that in part of these things that he was being taped, he said, "Oh, yes, go ahead, that's fine, that's dandy, do it," and so forth. It was not a conscious — do you see what I am talking about?

I think he has been very, very much maligned because I still think there is something very peculiar that at this situation when the people went into their building so-called "stealing" the things, then they found that the things that they had locked were unlocked. They must have known that somebody had caught on or that somebody was there doing something wrong. Then to have the number of unusual people right in the area to be able to get there like that, there is something a little bit very unusual.

It could have been a planned, set-up thing, and I still think it was. I don't know who did it or anything of that kind, but it's a little bit too-too.

Sharp: If you look back to what was certainly a more optimistic time for Mr. Nixon in '62, was that a kind of coalescing for the Republican party behind Mr. Nixon for governor or not so much?

Storrs: Yes and no. Sharp: In what respects?

Storrs: I am just trying to think really. You have always had this kind of division.

Sharp: Do you mean within the party?

15

Storrs: Yes, north and south and between the, what do we say, the [Thomas] Kuchels and the what-do-you-call-thems that didn't agree on a lot of issues, let's put it that way. But I can remember we did pretty well for Nixon, but then we had been a more conservative town.

Sharp: Yes, that's true.

Storrs: We always have been, whether because we were — San Diego today, they don't consider themselves a big city. They don't. You can ask anybody: "Where are you from?" "I'm from Clairmont." "I'm from La Jolla." "I'm from North Park." They don't say, "Oh, I'm from San Diego." They'd say, "Oh, I'm from University City," and yet they are all San Diego.

Sharp: You were mentioning that the organization that went on in San Diego was real important. I wondered in terms of this early period, really before '64, if there were some major issues that the party as a whole was struggling with.

Storrs: What we tried to do was to keep the county committee, the federa tion, the Young Republicans, CRA, UROC, all of that, very closely together. Now, UROC, yes, was very conservative. The Republican League was very liberal. Do you see what I mean?

Sharp: Yes. You also had Republican Associates in there.

Storrs: Republican Associates, which basically Bob [Robert C.] Walker — oh, you ought to —

Sharp: We did.

Storrs: Where is Bob now?

Sharp: He is in Washington and I had an interview with him this summer [1982].

Storrs: Oh, he is? He was in Boulder, Colorado. He was with Coors.

Sharp: He is still with Coors, but he is in Washington heading up their national affairs. He was great and he has promised me another interview just on the 1968 Republican national convention.*

*There are two oral history interviews with Mr. Walker conducted as part of this Reagan Era series.

16

Storrs: You know it was the darndest thing about Bob Walker. He had worked for a congressman (and he probably wouldn't tell you this), [telephone rings: tape interruption] He was running for office and he had had a big party at the Ambassador, nothing to do with campaigning, in which he went to Bob Walker and said, "You sign the chits." Bob said, "I can't do that. That's not campaigning. That's something you did on your own." He said, "I told you to pay these bills," and they were large ones. Bob said, "I'm sorry, I can't. I couldn't do it because it isn't campaign money." They guy said, "You're fired," and he was. He went over and worked in the 1962 Nixon campaign, I think.

All right, when the San Diego Republican leaders were talking about doing a Republican Associates, because they had one in Los Angeles, various people would call me and said, "Would you call some people up in Los Angeles or someplace? We think it would be better to have somebody from out of town start Republican Associates than to get into anything here." Would you see what sort of recommendations you can get?"

So I called Cecil Kenyon, a former president of the California Federation of Republican Women. I called — I am trying to think, what other people? But women that were very much in the — maybe Gladys O'Donnell or Dorothy Goodknight or any of those. Oma — I forget.

Sharp: Who was that?

Storrs: Oma Umphey. She may not have been there then, but I called sort of all of the top women up there in Los Angeles and I said, "Now, if you were picking a staff guy that is really efficient and so forth and so on, who would you pick?" They said, "Bob Walker," and I got the same thing from every single one of them. So when I reported in, I said, "From what I can gather, Bob Walker. I don't know him at all, but that's what they said."

So they had a number of people come down and interview for this job and Bob Walker was picked and he established Republican Associates and did an absolutely fabulous job with them. Now, it still goes on and it's fairly good. I can go over once in a while because I was like a founding member or something and they'll call me and I would get over at different times. But then Fete Wilson came in when Bob left.

Sharp: And took over Bob's role?

Storrs: Yes, in Republican Associates.

Sharp: Is that how Fete Wilson got started in politics?

17

Storrs: He came into our Republican headquarters when he had just gotten out of the marine corps. Ruth Jackson and I were running volunteers and he came in there [laughs] and started in with us as a volunteer. He was just out of the marine corps and he said, "I want to work." I've forgotten, maybe [it was] the Goldwater campaign. I forget.

The Goldwater Candidacy and the Republican National Convention. 1964; General Notes on Political Conventions

Sharp: Let's get to the Goldwater campaign and the Republican national convention.

Storrs: In San Francisco.

Sharp: In San Francisco. Now, when we talked on the phone you mentioned to me that Bill Knowland had had a really important role. I think that he was Mr. Goldwater's campaign head.

Storrs: No, now wait a minute. No, I don't think Bill was. Oh, wait a

minute, let me go get my Goldwater books or I will get a. Goldwater book, [tape interruption; goes through books]

Now, wait a minute, here is our San Diego County. Sharp: Okay. Oh, that's good. May I have this? Storrs: Yes. Sharp: Oh, great.

Storrs: Let me give you this, too. I was headquarters chairman, [continues to go through papers] Now, here is national headquarters with Jimmy Doolittle, Clair Booth Luce, Clif White. This is the whole schmeer, addresses and everything else.

Sharp: Yes, that's a complete folder there — everything. Storrs: You see, I'm a pack rat. I save stuff. Sharp: I think it's great; it's a researcher's dream.

Storrs: What I would always do anyway instead of throwing out all of the campaign material left over, I would bring part of it home, [laughs]

17 a GOLD WATER FOR PRESIDENT SAN DIEGO COUNTY CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE

San Diego County Campaign Headquarters, 707 Broadway, Room 1012 / 234-3366 / San Diego 1, California

Charles K. Fletcher. Co-Chairman

Home Federal Savings & Loan Association

7th 4 Broadway, S.D. 239-7581

C. Arnholt Smith, Co-Chairman

U.S. National Bank

2nd & Broadway, S.D. 234-4311

Mrs. Helen Alvarez Hill. Co-Chairman P.O Box 945. La Jolla GL 4-0479

Senator Jack Schrade,

Campaign Director

1350 Front Street

Room 6046, 232-4361. Ext. 281

Assemblyman Hale Ashcraft

1008 Prospect St.. La Jolla 454-0080

Charles Badger

1634 Glasgow

Cardiff by-the-Sea 753-3097

Assemblyman E. Richard Barnes State of California Building. Rm. 6036 1350 Front St.. S.D. 232-4361. Ext. 291

David L. Blair

2850 Fifth Avenue. Suite 222

2988845

Henry A. Boney

P.O. Box 698, La Mesa 4652101

Prof. Ray Borst

S.D. State College

5402 College Ave.. S.D. 582-4411

Al Breitbard

101 - 16th St.. S.D. 232-7801

Assemblyman Clair Burgener State of California Building Rm. 6042. 1350 Front St San Diego 232-4361. Ext. 287

Assemblyman Richard Donovan 1001 Plaza Blvd.. Rm 229 National City 474-2245

Major Reuben Fleet

565 Gage Lane. S.D. 6 222-8923

Mrs. Rhoda (Leslie) Gehres

8001 Vista Dr.. La Mesa 466-3567

Robert J. Harmon

920 Kline. La Jolla 454-7777

William Hollingsworth

1625 Hillcrest Dr.. Fallbrook 728-2374

Albert E. Jarrell

P.O. Box 26. Ramona 789-1804

Dr. Roy Ledford

2881 4th Avenue. S.D. 295 2137

Gordon C. Luce

Home Federal Savings 4 Loan Assn.

7th & Broadway. S.D. 239-7581

Victor R. Lundy

P.O. Box 772. S.D. 12 232-3016

Harold A. Mosier

8308 La Jolla Shore Dr., La Jolla 459-5730

Leon Parma

Ryan Aeronautical Co.

2701 Harbor Dr.. S.D. 296-6681

or 454 2517 or (H) 459-2284

Mrs. Eleanor Ring

801 Tolita, Coronado 435-4524

Mrs. Gladys Selz

1226 Prospect St.. La Jolla 454-1589

Harry Singh

P.O. Box 629, Oceanside 722-2653

Fred Speers

118 Caroline Way, Escondido 745-0687

Rodney S. Sprigg

2044 First Ave., S.D. 239-3628

Frank A. Thornton

12th Floor, U.S. National Bank Bldg.

S.D. 2395771

Jack Williams

S.D. Fence Company

3820 Midway Dr., S.D. 223-7181

Dick Wilson

249 E St.. Chula Vista 422 6174

17b

(Citizens Tor \j7oldvvater-Millep — San Diego

In your heart, you know he's right

MAIN HEADQUARTERS

9O3 SIXTH STREET

SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 921O1

234-3366

234-6324

ROY M. LEDFORD, M.D. CAMPAION CHAIRMAN

SENATOR JACK SCHRAOE CAMPAIGN DIRECTOR AND MANAGER

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

CHARLES K. FLETCHER CHAIRMAN

VICTOR LUNDY MRS. ELEANOR RING CAP! WM. BALL MRS. JAMES O. PIKE JOHN J. IRWIN CHARLES H. BLAIR GORDON LUCE JACK WILLIAMS

ADVISORY COUNCIL HOMER WOODLINS DR. GEO. DUNKLEE ROYAL MOREY MRS. MARTHA SMITH DR. JAMES KETCHAM MRS. ELEANOR KINNEY TED JARD1NE

GRACE LAWRENCE THACKERAY MATTHEW REDLINGER MISS HELENE NAGEL MRS. FLORENCE ABBEY WALTER MERRILL RALPH HAGLOCK CMDR. JOHN STULL VADM. ALBERT JARRELL

HEADQUARTERS CHAIRMAN MRS. ELEANOR RING

"GOLDWATER GUIDE- CHANDLER SCOTT

EMOCRATS FOR

WILLIAM 8CROGGS

CHAIRMAN DISTRICT I DR. FREDRICK HOLLANDER

CHAIRMAN DISTRICT X WALTER (PIKE) HODGE

CHAIRMAN DISTRICT * DR. JAMES VERNETTI

CHAIRMAN DISTRICT 4

ASSISTANT TO CAMPAIGN DIRECTOR

JAMES O. PIKE

18

Sharp: It looks like you brought more and more all of the time!

You mentioned that you had been at the convention, at that '64 convention, and I wondered how exactly you had participated.

Storrs: I was an alternate. In most cases, when they would say, "Now, you can be a delegate," I would say, "No, I would rather have so-and- so," because we had guys that I felt should be on there much more so. I would rather be an alternate. So I was always very much into that. Well, then they forced me to be! [laughter] Because to me it was sort of so what. Then there were certain ones I had to because I had to do certain platform things and such like. So you have to be a delegate or you can't get on Republican committees at convention now. Now, here were our county co-ordinators, the women.

Sharp: So this would have been for all of the counties, for Imperial, Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernadino, San Diego, Santa Barbara —

Storrs: The southern division.

Sharp: The southern division; you would have been responsible for co ordinating some of the work?

Storrs: To some extent, yes.

Sharp: Would some of these women have been alternates as well or were they more strictly behind the scenes?

Storrs: [reading from list] Louise Hartman, Helen Grubb, I think Kate Haley was, Hazel Stroshime in Orange County.

Sharp: So at the convention there were certain notable —

Storrs: Let me look here. Marjorie Benedict. Charlie Fletcher, of course, I had known all of my life. He is somebody that ought to be interviewed on some of this stuff. He was a congressman. Yes, there's Helen Grubb, Lucile Hosmer.*

^Interested readers may see an oral history conducted with Lucile Hosmer, A Conservative Republican in the Mainstream of Party Politics. Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, U.C. Berkeley, 1983. Also, one conducted with Marjorie Benedict, Developing a_ Place for Women in the Republican Party. Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, U.C. Berkeley, in process.

19

Sharp: But you were saying that you spent your time doing what now? Storrs: Working on the rules and platform committees.

Sharp: Let me just show you this for comparison. I also have the list of the people who were the [Nelson] Rockefeller delegates, so you can just see. I don't know if you probably had seen that at one time. Now, who were those?

Storrs: Yes, Kuchel and Knight, Christopher, Leonard Firestone, Anthony

Clark, Lee Sherry. Then, you see, it was after this that we had to get together and Leonard came with his — we had one committee. Maybe there were five of us. I was the only woman on it — Leonard, Holmes Tuttle, Tom Reed, and I, and who was the fifth one? [pauses to recall] No, it wasn't Justin Dart.

Sharp: Mr. Rubel perhaps?

Storrs: No. But some of these people left us entirely and some of them

stayed and went along, no question about it. Lee, of course, did. See, here's your game. There you are, your liberals and your conservatives. [laughs]

Sharp: Yes, very much so, and these names show up on the same sides all the way through perhaps, at least that is the way it seems.

Storrs: To a great extent, but there has been a coming together. On the other hand, a lot of us can remember when these guys — the Kuchel s and these kinds of people were out to cut your throat.

Sharp: Had things changed very much from the Earl Warren period when there were such stringent —

Storrs: I don't know because I didn't know that much really about that

period because the first convention I went to was in '60 in Chicago as an alternate and Bob Wilson wanted me to go. So then I got interested in "what's going on around here?" [laughter] Of course, I am a great believer [that] the more people at the local level that you get involved, the better off you are — I mean really involved and they get involved in government and this is fine.

Sharp: I wanted us to get a few more notes on Bill Know land because he is such an interesting figure.

Storrs: Bill Knowland was a very outstanding guy. I have always liked him very much. I think he had a real rough go-around. There were a number of situations where — in the first place, when they changed over there where he was going to run and he gave up his Senate seat and everything —

20

Sharp: Storrs: Sharp : Storrs:

Sharp : Storrs:

Sharp :

Storrs;

Sharp: Storrs:

In '58.*

Yes. I wished they hadn't.

It really caused them a lot of problems.

Yes, people see it the way they see it, though there were a lot of us who were not really in favor of this.

ft

Why was he working on Mr. Goldwater's campaign do you think?

I think that he realized what had to be done and that kind of stuff.

Goldwater, of course, had succeeded in the primary and I guess was gathering quite a bit of momentum for the general election, which was going to come in November. I wondered if the party was beginning to really come together behind Mr. Goldwater?

I think they certainly did at that time, know happened in there.

It's a real rough period.

Now, later with — I don't

Of course, remember, during the period when I am national committeewoman [1968-1972], I must stay out of all other elections. I mean that's your obligation. Your obligation is only to work with people for the party. You are a Republican committeewoman, so you do not pre-primary endorse and you do not get into any of these elections at all (which I was in a great deal of the time because I was also a vice-chairman of the southern division and even a county president). The same thing, you may not pre-primary endorse in the federation. This you must not unless you wish to resign. You just can't do it. The minute the primary is over, okay.

Now, in the Goldwater thing I was fine because I had finished being county president, so that I was free to do as I wanted to and I could go into the Goldwater [campaign]. Cynthia Laird, who now

*In 1958 William Knowland ran for governor of California instead of for re-election as U.S. Senator from California. Governor Knight did not run for re-election. He ran for Know land's Senatorial seat instead. This was called the "Big Switch"; both men lost.

21

lives in Santa Barbara, her name is [Mrs. Ted] Heyer [spells name], she worked just as strongly on the Goldwater thing as I did, perfectly marvelous. She is very strong in the know (meaning knowledgeable) and remembers a lot about the political stuff, [laughs, pause] But she is a lot younger to begin with.

But we have a lot of very, very remarkable people, I mean people I think who have been — now, Paul Haerle went the other way, you see.

Sharp: There was that split later on.*

Storrs: Yes, and I said to him, "I just can't believe it." But in the

meantime, he and his wife had split up. Very often the domestic things came into these things. I think that was part of the Knowland thing, too. Now, I've always felt that Frank Adams, whom I admire greatly, although lots of times we haven't agreed on things, he always stayed exactly correctly, do you know what I mean? We could argue about various things, always in a very friendly way, and usually come to some solution. Of course, Tom Reed, good Lord, Tom, and of course you must — he is in Washington now. He always wanted to go his own way.

[laughs] Well, Tom is a strange guy. His wife I'm very fond of. She is a perfectly delightful woman and a very smart woman. They had met when they were going to Cornell together.

Sharp: Is she active too within the party?

Storrs: Not too much; more active with her children, her family. Is that on?

Sharp: Yes.

Storrs: Oh, all right, [laughs] All the odd experiences one has. My

husband and I are landing in Syracuse — this is about '78 or '79 — and we are going for a week in New York to see some family and, oh, we had an awful time getting in, a storm and all that stuff. We get in and we have rented a car and we are both carrying a suitcase. All of a sudden there is woman walking down here carrying a bag over her shoulder and a bag here. All of a sudden she drops all of her bags and just stands there. I said, "Good heavens, I

*In the 1976 Republican presidential campaigns, a group of people who had originally worked for Mr. Reagan while he was governor supported Gerald Ford for president instead of Reagan.

22

wonder what happened to that" — whether something had happened to her. So I ran over: Tom Reed's wife. She said, "Imagine, seeing you in an airport in Syracuse when I haven't seen you in years." She had been up on something. She's a trustee at Cornell University. [laughs] So we stand in the airport and talk old times for a half hour.

Sharp: [laughter] With suitcases and everything sort of all over!

Storrs: Yes, but that's the strange thing in this political thing. You run into people when you least expect it.

Sharp: When you go to these conventions you must —

Storrs: No, I want other people to go to the conventions. I'll help, but I don't want to be appointed to any of these things. I didn't want to be appointed to any presidential commissions, having known Helene von Damm and Ed Meese and of course Ursula Meese, I had in the beginning any number of calls: You know, "Eleanor would you go on so-and-so?" "No thank you very much, I don't want to go on any of them. I want other people on them. I'll suggest names, but no way. You want your younger people in here and, sure, I can check on so-and-so or check on so-and-so," those kind of things. Sure, I'm happy to do it and I can come back and say "dandy," "I don't know," or "I'd be a little leery" or something. With any of these things you do, you have to make always at least four or five phone calls of totally different types if you are going to get a balanced opinion, which I discovered very early.

Sharp: Was that pretty important in the organizing that you did in San Diego?

Storrs: Of course, it is because you have got to get, if somebody is going to come in in a certain job, this woman or man has to be someone, at least I've always felt, that must be respected by all different kinds of groups. Otherwise, how are you going to get them together? If it is someone that they have admired in doing such- and-so or something else, then they can come in and say, "All right, let's get this going."

Republican National Commit teewoman. 1968-1972

Sharp: It strikes me that with the Republican party, the central committee in the struggling for the different positions, that that's exactly what was the problem with it, that there wasn't very much agreement on who would be —

23

Storrs: Yes, of the pulling together.

Sharp: Ann Bowler came in at just about this time to be national commit- teewoman [January 1967].

Storrs: She and Gardiner Johnson came in.*

Sharp: This is, of course, just after Mr. Reagan has become governor. It would have been a good period for the Republican party with a new governor.

Storrs: Yes, and that was when (and Ann and I had talked about it), let me see, when was it? It was the January [1968] before the meeting of the delegation in June. I was up in Sacramento on an executive meeting, and they came to me about originally being national committeewoman. So I went and talked to Ann and she said, "Yes, because we want to stay in. Then Gardiner didn't want to leave. (This is kind of off the record.) Then Ann left for someplace. About a month or so later she called me and said [emphatic tone], "No, I'm going to stay on." I said, "Ann, it's already done." Oh, Gardiner was upset, Ann was upset.

We since have, you might say, been able to work together, but at that stage she and Gardiner both felt they should have stayed.

Sharp: Why is it that they were not able to stay?

Storrs: Because Reagan wanted new people and Tom Reed was someone that he felt — or the people around there and Bill Clark, they kind of sit down and kick this stuff around. They're nominated to the delegation and then they are elected at the convention. Nobody ever knows when it takes place. The secretary of the party stands up and says, "Nominated for national committeewoman from Arizona or Arkansas" — she reads of all of the names — "all those in favor," and nobody has heard a word and then you're elected.

But where you are nominated is within your delegation and then that's all. Now, for instance, Gordon Luce nominated me. There is usually one nomination for committeewoman and one for committeeman — period. It is all pretty much set up ahead of time.

*Gardiner Johnson was Republican national committeeman between 1964 and 1968. Readers are directed to his interview in the Reagan Era series.

24

Sharp: When you came in then, it was something that you resisted?

Storrs: Well, I just had felt that there were younger people that could have done it. Apparently it was as much staff [matters] as anything else, no "we want the local" and so forth and "Tom will do the other." When we were going to have the convention in San Diego — when was that?

Sharp: In '72.

Storrs: It was decided it was going to be in San Diego. So Tom Reed came

to me and said, "You are in charge." I said, "Come off it, you and I are together in charge." He said, "I can't possibly. You're in charge. I'll give you any staff you want. Pick your top staff person and let me know and get the headquarters in San Diego and so forth." So I said, "All right." So I [laughs] picked Esther Rushford. Do you know who Esther is?

Sharp: No, I sure don't.

Storrs: Esther Rushford Green, she's with the California Chamber of

Commerce or has been up there in Sacramento. Oh, Lord, what's her last name? She was on staff of the state committee and did a fabulous job. So I asked for her and Tom said, "You are asking for a woman?" I said, "Yes, she's the most efficient staff [person] I've ever seen work in the state." So he said, "All right." Esther came down here and we established the office.

Bill Timmons called me from Kansas City and he said, "Eleanor, we're in problems because of Ed Reinecke and all that stuff," which again they misinterpreted. There was nothing wrong about the Sheraton people getting this money to the convention thing, it really wasn't. Then the agreement was that Nixon would be there opening their big thing. Well, that following year what did they do? They took a plane load of people to some place all paid for by the hotel to open one of the Hiltons in Greece or something, campaign stuff. Jeepers!

Anyway, so Paula Hawkins was national committeewoman in Florida at the time. I happen to also be very fond of her. We always got along on the national committee. So I called her and I said, "Paula, in case you don't know it, it's [the convention] going to move to Miami," and this is like the end of April or May. She said, "What?" I said, "Yes, and you're in charge." She said, "Oh!" [laughs] So she said, "Eleanor, you've got to help me." So I said, "All right, I'll come on over," which I did. Esther came with me and we went down with Paula — and she is a very efficient woman — setting this stuff up for the convention which was what, July in Miami?

25

Sharp: Yes, I believe so.

Storrs: But I can tell you, out of all this some of the most marvelous

things come. Paula and I are in the convention hall just before the convention trying to be sure that everybody had the box they wanted to have, and somebody wouldn't be mad because they were behind somebody else or something. At that stage, the orchestra started to play. There was nobody in the whole place and the orchestra started to play and you're up here. What's going on? Ethel Merman starts practicing the things she is going to sing at the convention. Paula and I both sat down and there she sang for an hour or so — you know, "let's do this again, a little faster there, a little slow there." We sat there and listened to the entire rehearsal and then both of us got up and just clapped like crazy and she looked around! [laughter]

But these are the unusual things that will happen when you least expect them.

Sharp: So you had your own private concert while you were getting ready? Storrs: Well, of course!

Sharp: After everything got ironed out about San Diego, it must have been a fairly interesting convention I would think.

Storrs: Yes, it really was. I think my most difficult time in it came one night. I had been to some dinner or something and I had got back and we were a fair ways out at a hotel, a fair ways out. I got back and I got this call from Nancy Clark Reynolds. She said, "Eleanor, there is a governors' meeting tonight at midnight at one of the hotels way downtown and the governor has asked that you represent him." I said, "What?" She said, "Yes, I'll be by to pick you up in about twenty minutes or so." I said, "Give me a half hour." I was dirty — do you know what I mean? — so I got in the shower and went on down. These were the Republican governors and the meeting was chaired by the governor from Massachusetts.

Sharp: Saltonstall?

Storrs: I think so, and most of them were very liberal. They started

getting into some things and finally I had to put up my hand and say, "I'm sorry, I can't agree with that and I don't think that Governor Reagan would agree with it." Then they get in a great hassle and finally this governor from Kentucky or Tennessee, a strong conservative, he walked in (he hadn't been there earlier) and he said, "I totally agree with California," and, brother, he gets in and really lays it into them.

26

Sharp: What was the issue that they were —

Storrs: They were talking about platform and stuff like that, things that they wanted in, and this was sort of a very small Republican meeting — you see, there weren't that many Republican governors. So we were there until about three o'clock and then the darling governor from Maine — I forgot who that was, I knew his name, but I had never known him, but he and his wife said, "How are you getting home?" I said, "Oh, I'll get a cab." They said, "Oh, no, you won't at this time of night. Because we're out close to there, too, you're going with us," which I did. So we went on out.

I got back to the hotel to have Phyllis Schlafly — let me think, who else? — sitting waiting for me. "Eleanor, can we get tickets to the so-and-so? Do you think we could get so-and-so?" I said, "I don't know why not." Well, I never got to bed at all that night. I went for two nights and never got to bed at all! [laughs]

Sharp: Were there lots of these meetings? Storrs: Yes, and they'd start — Sharp: At off hours when people —

Storrs: Yes, the only time that you could — a two o'clock meeting for such- and-so, then you finish this, and then you go tearing over to such- and-so; all sorts of different types of things, different sorts of things.

Sharp: I am interested in the platform discussions and what the purpose of the wrangling was about the platform.

Storrs: Basically, again, it would be conservative and liberal. We had

gone through every single platform of trying to keep them into less government interference, less regulation at the federal level — again, constantly trying to get it back for the state to adminis ter, for the state to have the county to administer, the county to have the city administer, and to not [have] all the money going to Washington. Then you get back money that they decide you may have, and what was it? At one stage, somebody figured it out of the $1.39 that each Californian sent to the federal thing, California got back 29c- Whether it is for the aging or the hospital (you know what I mean), there are all of the different federal things that the federal government has gotten into which they never should have.

They should have been left within the states' rights because different states do different things and that's basically what our platforms were always trying to do, get more and more. This is

27

Sharp:

Storrs;

exactly what the president is trying to do, get some of these federal regulations off of things that can be very damaging, particularly in certain states. Our states are totally different, not only weatherwise, populationvise, commercial, everything else. They are totally different states. They have different industries, whether they are an agricultural state or a manufacturing state, they're just totally different and they are better off if those decisions are left at the state level. Then you get rid of a tremendous amount of bureaucracy.

Now, a year or so ago I went on this [federal] Commission on Aging and 1 was a deputy chairman. There were six of us deputy chairmen and a very interesting group, too. One of them was of a Spanish-Mexican background, one of them black, and so forth. The gal from Texas, I think, who was of Mexican background, she's the woman that had started the Hospice situation, people would have nursing at home done at the local level. Do you see what I mean? Oh, you'd think, sure, now hospices. We have one in San Diego, a marvelous thing done at the local level, paid for at the local level. It gives us better service than anything.

You get into dear old Senator [Claude] Pepper and all of this — layers and layers of the HEW [Department of Health, Education and Welfare]. Practically one whole floor to do — what are they doing? Telling somebody in Mississippi how the older people should live or in New York City. If you put it down here, Mississippi can handle that better or New York could.

The same thing you get statewide. We have an enormous Commission on Aging, all paid staff. [It] all comes out of the money for aging. You have it at the county level, you have it at the city level. You have it over in San Diego — a great big [bureaucracy]. Who are these people on staff? What are they doing? All of that money going into staff stuff. If the money could be put down here, with very minor staff, where it should be to really pay attention, because there are people that really need care and they don't get it.

It seems like in some respects you may have been representing Mr. Reagan at several different levels, like the example at the 1972 Republican national convention when you were sent to go to this meeting and represent him. Did you feel pretty comfortable being his representative?

Yes, I think as much as anything else because we have always thought along the same lines, you know what I mean?

Sharp: It sounds like it.

28

Storrs: We have always thought along the same lines and it's back to the old thing of government is best at the local level. That's your most economic, your most efficient government because the more you can have at the local level — your free enterprise system, not these subsidies from the government all of the time. Give these people an opportunity to form their own jobs and businesses. Don't regulate them to the extent that there is no money left to do their business. They have to put in so darn many reports that they have to employ extra people to do the reports.

Sharp: Now, with the '72 convention, it seems like it's a real different one for Mr. Reagan and for the delegation in the sense that Mr. Reagan is not a candidate. He is head of the delegation as the governor of California. What else was going on in terms of possible future candidacies for Mr. Reagan at this '72 convention. Is there a level of activity that you could describe?

Storrs: I think there were a fair number of us that felt that when he went as governor that he was certainly fully capable of being president. That is why the thing was done in '76 — Paul Laxalt. Senator Paul Laxalt organized a Reagan for President Committee. I was the only woman on the letterhead. We felt strongly in his [Ronald Reagan's] ability to take on the job and do for the U.S. what he had done for California.

Sharp: Were there some people helping him actually at the '72 convention who might have been there to work specifically on that?

Storrs: No, not really I don't think. It was certainly a feeling that a number of people would discuss and say, "You should be our candidate in '76." You got it from a lot of different areas. I had women come to me and say, "Eleanor, do what you can."

I'm sorry that he didn't make the '76 because I think it would have been better. I have been very sorry about the Ford victory — and again sometimes you have to remember that there are domestic problems that come into certain families that get very complicated, which certainly was with President Ford.

Sharp: There were some notes that I had seen about this Ford-Reagan split and some members, specifically within the California Republican party, were pushing against the control that Mr. Reagan seemed to be exercising on the party.

Storrs: Yes, yes, there were some. Again, you get your — what do I say? — your more liberal Republicans that were the Ford [supporters], [pause] Of course, Tom Reed to a certain extent went for Ford. Well, he was appointed as, what, assistant secretary of something

28a

CORONADOAN STEPS DOWN

For Mrs. Ring the night was something special

SMCM I* IVENINO TBIBUNB

MIAMI BEACH — Eleanor Ring of Coronado, the first lady of lie Cali fornia Republican party, stood at atten tion last night for the opening of the final session of the Republican National Convention.

In her face was reflected the pride and dignity with which she has served the Republicans for more than 20 years.

It was a special night for her, not only because it will probably be her last political convention as a delegate, but also because she had played an im portant part in its planning — first in San Diego and later in Miami.

And last night she had the honor of escorting the vice president to the plat form.

Mrs. Ring said that she leaves her position as the national com- mitteewoman with no regrets. "The balance of powers for the Republican party is strong," she said.

"And I think that there comes a time to retire," she said. "It is a joy to see these young ones coming up."

Succeeding Mrs. Ring is Janet John ston, 32, of Winters, Calif., the youngest person ever to serve on the party's na tional committee.

She will spend the next four years, as Is the custom, preparing for the par ty's next convention, and working to support Republican candidates on the local, state and national levels.

"It is my hope," Miss Johnston, "that we can become the majority par ry in California over the next four years.

"The name of the game is to get the candidates elected."

Miss Johnston said she has always been interested in po 1 i t i c s . Recall ing the Republican Convention in 1952, when D w i g h t D. Eisenhower was elected, she remembers staying up late